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I.  INTRODUCTION: THE “NECESSARY AND PROPER” EXERCISE OF THE FEDERAL TREATY 
POWER 
 
 
The Treaty Clause of the United States Constitution declares that the President 
“shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, 
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”1  A casual inspection of the stark 
text of the Treaty Clause seems to yield two seemingly obvious propositions: that the 
Treaty Clause is an affirmative grant of power to both the President and the Senate and 
that there are no internal textual limitations on the scope of the federal treaty power.  
Both of these seemingly obvious propositions are long-settled law.  Both propositions are 
supported by a strong academic and historical consensus.  And both propositions are 
wrong as a matter of the Constitution’s original meaning. 
The Constitution’s Treaty Clause does in fact grant power to the Senate, but it 
grants no power to the President that he or she does not otherwise possess by virtue of 
“[t]he executive Power” vested by the first sentence of Article II.2  The Treaty Clause 
confirms, clarifies, and qualifies the President’s power to make treaties, but it does not 
grant that power.  Moreover, the federal treaty power is subject to very substantial, albeit 
subtle, constitutional limitations on its exercise.  If properly viewed through the lens of 
                                                 
*  Professor, Boston University School of Law.  We are grateful to David Golove, Vasan Kesavan, and the 
participants at a workshop at Boston University School of Law for valuable comments.  This article 
expands on material that appears in Chapter 2 of a book that we have published, see Gary Lawson & Guy 
Seidman, The Constitution of Empire: Territorial Expansion and American Legal History 33-72 
(2004), and we thank Yale University Press for permission to utilize and build upon that material. 
 
**  Assistant Professor, Interdisclinary Center, Herzliya. 
 
1   U.S. Const. art II, § 2, cl 2. 
2   Id. art. II, § 1. 
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original meaning, the treaty power can only be used to implement or carry into effect 
other federal powers granted by the Constitution, and any such implementational use of 
the federal treaty power must be proportionate, measured, and respectful of background 
principles concerning rights and governmental structure.  In other words, any exercise of 
the federal treaty power must be -- to borrow a phrase from another constitutional 
provision – “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution”3 other federal powers.  
There is both much more and much less to the Treaty Clause than meets the eye. 
The theory of the Treaty Clause that we present here, which views treaties solely 
as devices for reasonably implementing other constitutional powers, was inspired by 
Thomas Jefferson, who articulated a similar view of the clause more than 200 years ago.  
We hasten to add that Jefferson’s position was never historically ascendant, and Jefferson 
himself did not develop or defend the position in precisely the fashion that we do.  We do 
not ground our position on the authority of Jefferson or on the weight of sympathy with 
Jefferson’s views expressed by other founding-era figures.  Rather, we base our claims 
about the Constitution’s original meaning on the text and structure of the Constitution 
itself.4 
A proper understanding of the treaty power is essential to an integrated 
understanding of American constitutionalism.  The treaty power has always been one of 
the most important, and most controversial, federal powers.  In the founding era, it was at 
the center of issues concerning the very character of the nation, such as territorial 
expansion and the eligibility of aliens to own real property.  In recent years, the rise of 
                                                 
3   Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 
4   For those who wonder how a view that was not ascendant in Jefferson’s own time could possibly 
represent the Constitution’s original meaning, see infra XX. 
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globalization and the resulting proliferation of treaties addressing an ever-increasing 
range of subjects has put the treaty power equally at the center of modern constitutional 
debate.  The Treaty Clause’s original meaning, of course, will not be regarded by 
everyone as decisive, or even relevant, to that debate.  But for those who consider 
original meaning to be in any respect important or interesting, we hope to provoke some 
thought about a long-misunderstood constitutional clause. 
The Treaty Clause is located in Article II, section 2 of the Constitution.  Section 1 
of Article II begins by vesting “[t]he executive Power” of the United States in the 
President.  This clause is a grant of power – the “executive Power” – to the President.5  
That “executive Power” includes the power to make treaties.  The Treaty Clause, as is 
true of many of the provisions in sections 2 and 3 of Article II, confirms the existence of 
that particular presidential power and qualifies it by requiring Senate ratification of 
treaties, but the President’s treaty power derives from the Article II Vesting Clause rather 
than from the Treaty Clause. 
The source of the power has important implications for its scope.  Executive 
power of the kind granted by the Article II Vesting Clause is generally implementational 
by nature; it is the power to carry into effect law made by other actors.6  The treaty 
power, as an aspect of the executive power, shares this implementational nature; it is the 
power to carry law into effect in the international arena.  Furthermore, executive power is 
generally subject to the principle of reasonableness, which is a venerable principle of 
British administrative law that requires exercises of delegated implementational power, 
                                                 
5   See infra XX. 
 
6   See infra XX. 
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such as executive power, to be proportionate, measured, efficacious, and rights-
regarding.7  The treaty power, as an implementational executive power, must conform to 
the principle of reasonableness.  Thus, federal treaties must carry into effect some federal 
power other than the treaty power itself, and they must do so in a reasonable, 
proportionate, rights-regarding manner. 
To be sure, this “Jeffersonian” or “implementational” (and we will henceforth use 
those terms interchangeably) conception of the treaty power is at least facially 
problematic along every dimension that might be thought relevant for constitutional 
meaning: textual, intratextual, structural, historical, and doctrinal.  Textually, the Treaty 
Clause is phrased as an unlimited grant of power.  Intratextually, the Article I Sweeping 
Clause expressly limits Congress’s implementational legislative powers to the enactment 
of “Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” 8 other federal 
powers, which shows that the founding generation knew how to draft a “necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution” requirement when it wanted one.  Structurally, the 
Treaty Clause requires consent to treaties by two-thirds of the Senate, which suggests that 
the Constitution’s chosen method for limiting treaties might be procedural rather than 
substantive.  Historically, although our position was not utterly alien to the founding 
generation, it is distinctly anti-historical in most important respects.  And doctrinally, it 
has been settled law at least since the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in 1920 in 
                                                 
7   See infra XX. 
 
8   U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  Today, this clause is generally known as the “Necessary and Proper 
Clause.”  The founding generation, however, consistently referred to it as the “Sweeping Clause,” and we 
employ the original label here. 
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Missouri v. Holland9 that the Treaty Clause serves as a head of federal jurisdiction 
independent of, and potentially broader than, the other enumerated powers of the federal 
government.  Professor Gerald Neuman exemplifies the dominant doctrinal and academic 
consensus when he describes the Treaty Clause as “an independent grant of power to the 
federal government to enter into treaties that enact rules that Congress might not 
otherwise have been able to enact.”10 
In the course of this article, we will address all of these concerns.  Some of them 
dissolve fairly quickly under close scrutiny.  Others are substantial but ultimately not 
fatal to our understanding of the Treaty Clause.  In the end, there is no theory of the 
Treaty Clause that does not encounter very serious interpretative problems.  We do not 
claim that our interpretation of the Treaty Clause can be established beyond a reasonable 
doubt, but only that our theory is a better account of the Constitution’s original meaning 
than any competing alternatives.11 
                                                 
9   252 U.S. 416 (1920) (holding that the President and Senate could by treaty regulate the hunting of 
migratory birds in a fashion that went beyond then-established limitations on Congress’s legislative 
powers). 
 
10   Gerald L. Neuman, The Nationalization of Civil Liberties, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1630, 1646-47 (1999).  
This classic conception of the Treaty Clause has been defended with extraordinary thoroughness and 
sophistication by David Golove.  See David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical 
Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 1075 (2000). 
 
11   This raises the thorny problem of the appropriate standard of proof for claims about constitutional 
meaning – a problem that one of us has pondered at considerable length elsewhere.  See Gary Lawson, 
Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U.L. Rev. 859 (1992); Gary Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy: Its Cause and Cure, 
19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 411 (1996).  If propositions about constitutional meaning should only be 
accepted if they are proved beyond a reasonable doubt, relatively few propositions deserve acceptance.  We 
are not prepared to say that our claims about the Treaty Clause meet that lofty standard.  But if propositions 
should be accepted under a lower threshold, such as a “preponderance of the evidence” or a “best available 
alternative” standard, then we think that we have a good case for acceptance.  And one must keep in mind 
that the proper standard for acceptance may well vary with the context: the standard for acceptance in 
scholarship may not be the same as the standard for acceptance in adjudication.  See Lawson, Proving the 
Law, supra, at 877-80; note XX, infra. 
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The argument that we construct proceeds in several discrete steps.  In Part II, we 
define our interpretative approach, which we label “reasonable-observer originalism.”  
This approach looks for the meaning that would have been attributed to the Constitution 
by a reasonable founding-era observer in possession of all relevant information.  The 
methodology is thus originalist but not strictly historical.  Interpretation is a legal rather 
than historical enterprise, and we accordingly look primarily for hypothetical 
understandings that would have existed under ideal counterfactual conditions rather than 
for actual understandings. 
In Part III, we define what we mean by an “implementational” theory of the treaty 
power and present its Jeffersonian roots.  This discussion defines the limited scope of our 
inquiry.  There are a great many important questions concerning the federal treaty power 
that we do not address in this article, such as whether treaties are the exclusive method by 
which the federal government can enter into binding international arrangements and 
whether treaties can ever take effect without need for implementing legislation.  Our 
study is confined to the basic question whether the treaty power is, as current doctrine 
maintains, a unique kind of quasi-legislative power that defines its own sphere of 
jurisdiction or, as Jefferson maintained, purely an implementational power that can only 
act to implement other exercises of federal power.  That is more than enough to keep us 
busy. 
In Part IV, we establish some basic textual truths about the treaty power, the most 
jarring of which, at least to modern sensibilities, is that many express constitutional 
restrictions, most notably including the First Amendment, do not apply to the treaty 
power.  These truths become important at a subsequent stage of our argument when we 
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examine the structural and consequentialist arguments for the implementational theory of 
the Treaty Clause. 
In Part V, we present the bulk of our substantive argument by establishing that the 
Treaty Clause does not grant any power to the President but rather confirms and qualifies 
a presidential power derived from the Vesting Clause of Article II.  This crucial step in 
the argument requires us to construct a comprehensive theory of Article II of the 
Constitution.  In particular, in order to understand the Treaty Clause, one must first clear 
away the widespread misconception that the President draws power from sections 2 and 3 
of Article II.  The provisions in those sections confirm, clarify, and qualify presidential 
powers, and in some cases impose presidential duties, but they do not grant powers that 
are not otherwise derived from the Vesting Clause. 
We further show how the treaty power’s executive pedigree defines its scope and 
limits.  Executive power is essentially implementational power, and to the extent that the 
treaty power is executive, it shares this character.  Further, implementational executive 
power must be exercised in accordance with the principle of reasonableness, which in the 
eighteenth-century was a bedrock principle that required delegated executive power to be 
exercised in a measured, efficacious, and substantively reasonable fashion.  Federal 
treaties must therefore implement federal powers in a proportionate and rights-regarding 
manner. 
Part VI cements the case for the Jeffersonian, implementational theory of the 
treaty power by presenting consequentialist and epistemological reasons why the 
implementational view is the best originalist account of the federal treaty power.  The 
implementational view avoids what are otherwise bizarre results, and although it limits 
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the federal treaty power more than has the law over the past 200 years, it does not reach 
results that the founding generation would have found absurd. 
Part VII ends our discussion with some concluding remarks from Thomas 
Jefferson about his own theory.  Jefferson did not claim that his theory of the treaty 
power was without flaws.  Far from it.  He claimed only that it was better than any other 
theory that had been put forward.  That is our claim as well.  To paraphrase Churchill, the 
implementational theory of the treaty power is the worst possible theory except for all of 
the others. 
 
II.  TAKING INTERPRETATION SERIOUSLY: DEFINING “REASONABLE-OBSERVER 
ORIGINALISM” 
 
Before we pursue our task in earnest, we first need to define our interpretative 
approach.  We conduct our inquiry using what we call “reasonable-observer 
originalism,”which holds that the Constitution means what a fully-informed original 
audience would have understood it to mean after considering all relevant evidence and 
arguments.  Under this approach, original meaning represents hypothetical mental states 
that would have existed under (probably) counterfactual circumstances rather than actual 
mental states held by concrete historical persons.  It would require a book to explore the 
rationale for and mechanics of this approach, and that is certainly not our project here.12  
But a few brief comments are appropriate. 
                                                 
12   For some introductory thoughts on this approach, see Lawson & Seidman, supra note *, at 7-13; Vasan 
Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 
91 Geo. L.J. 1113 (2003); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The First “Establishment” Clause: Article VII 
and the Post-Constitutional Confederation, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 83, 87-93 (2002); Gary Lawson, On 
Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 Geo LJ 1823 (1997). 
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Law often tries to understand human affairs from the perspective of an ideal 
person rather than from the perspective of the actual actors in concrete cases.  Tort 
lawyers are familiar with the concept of the “reasonable person” as the touchstone for 
legal liability, and hypothetical constructs such as the reasonable person play an 
important role in other legal inquiries as well.13  The interpretation of a constitution is a 
legal act.  Evidence from other disciplines, such as history, psychology, political science, 
or economics, can be relevant to the interpretative enterprise, but at bottom a constitution 
is a legal instrument that can only be understood in legal terms. 
The perspective of a reasonable, fully-informed observer has always been 
implicitly understood by lawyers to be the appropriate perspective for constitutional 
interpretation.  Disputes about documentary meaning have never been thought to be fully 
resolvable by reference to nose counts, as would be true if actual mental states were the 
ultimate touchstone of reasoning.  Today, as in the eighteenth century, 
[p]eople give reasons for their views of meaning, and those reasons do not 
inevitably reduce to some calculation involving actual mental states.  Those 
reasons can involve pointing out some feature of the document that one’s 
opponents have not yet seen, or have undervalued, or have refused to 
acknowledge for political or other reasons.  In other words, they refer to mental 
states that would or might exist under counterfactual circumstances.  Those 
reasons can also, of course, include reference to actual mental states; one can 
certainly invoke the numbers, the eminence, or both of the proponents of a 
particular viewpoint.  But those actual mental states are evidence of meaning; they 
are not constitutive of meaning.14 
 
                                                 
13   We plan to explore this seemingly universal feature of legal systems in more depth in a subsequent 
work. 
 
14   Lawson & Seidman, supra note XX, at 91. 
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One of us has elsewhere identified the basic differences (and similarities) between 
reasonable-observer originalism and various intentionalist or historicist methodologies 
that might be more familiar: 
Operationally, the difference between reasonable-observer originalism and 
“intentionalist” approaches concerns the weight that is properly given to pieces of 
evidence rather than the admissibility of that evidence.  Reasonable-observer 
originalism focuses on what a fully informed, unbiased observer would have 
concluded after weighing all relevant evidence.  The expressed views of concrete 
historical individuals can provide modest evidence of what a reasonable observer 
would have concluded, but they are hardly the touchstone of an inquiry into 
meaning.  Actual participants in actual debates were not always in possession of 
all relevant information, were not always unbiased observers, and were not 
always (given the real-world stakes involved) necessarily honest about their own 
thoughts or their perceptions of the thoughts of others.  This is true of all forms of 
expressed views, including statements or actions of framers or ratifiers, statements 
or actions of legislators or executive officials, and statements or actions of judges.  
Precedents, whether testimonial, legislative, or judicial, are relatively weak 
evidence of original meaning.  Such evidence generally pales before evidence 
drawn from text, structure, interpretative conventions, and general background 
understandings about language, the document in question, and the world in which 
the document is embedded.15 
 
An approach such as ours that privileges an objective, hypothetical meaning does not 
consider materials such as “the records of the constitutional convention, the ratification 
debates, The Federalist, and early governmental practice” to be “the canonical originalist 
sources.”16  Instead, “one must always be prepared to ask whether an expressed 
understanding would have been different if the utterer had known or thought about X, Y, 
and Z.”17  A view that received only minimal expression during the founding era could 
                                                 
15   Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The “Proper” Understanding of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1701, 1707-08. 
 
16   Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1721, 
1733 (2002).  See also Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L. J. 1725, 1788 (1996) 
(taking for granted – mistakenly, our approach maintains -- that sound originalist arguments must focus on 
history, at least where texts are not clear on their face). 
 
17   Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making, 18 Const. 
Comm. 191, 196 n.20 (2001). 
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nonetheless represent the original meaning of the Constitution if one concludes that a 
fully-informed audience, after considering all of the relevant arguments, including 
arguments that may not have occurred to anyone at the time, would have accepted that 
view as correct. 
Put as simply as possible, our approach downplays, though it does not eliminate, 
the relevance of actual expressions of mental states and emphasizes the relevance of 
arguments from the text, organization, and context of the Constitution considered as a 
whole.18  To a reasonable-observer originalist, arguments from structure and first 
principles can easily outweigh even very impressive evidence about concrete historical 
understandings.  “Original understandings were not necessarily original meanings.”19  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
18   Of course, the expressed mental states of government officials, such as judges, are important to know if 
one wants to avoid getting into trouble with armed agents of the state, but they do not have a privileged 
status for determining the actual meaning of the Constitution. 
 
19   Lawson & Seidman, supra note *, at 12.  The obvious objection to reasonable-observer originalism is: 
how can the authority of the Constitution possibly be grounded in hypothetical mental states that may never 
have existed?  The obvious objection to the obvious objection is: this question confuses issues about the 
Constitution’s meaning with issues about the Constitution’s authority.  We are making no claims about the 
Constitution’s political or moral authority; we simply seek to uncover facts about its meaning.  One cannot 
know how much (if any) normative force the Constitution exerts without first knowing what the 
Constitution actually says. Put another way, understanding a constitution and deciding whether to follow it 
are two distinct operations.  The nature of the document and the nature of communication tell you how to 
discern a document’s meaning, though not what to do with that meaning once you have it. 
      More precisely, the nature of the document tells you part of what you need to know in order to interpret 
it.  Michael Dorf, in a characteristically thoughtful response to some of Professor Lawson’s prior work in 
this vein, see Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 Geo. L. J. 1823 (1997), has 
forcefully denied that interpretation can be divorced from normative concerns because “[w]hether we 
equate meaning with original public meaning, or with speaker’s meaning, or with a dynamic conception of 
meaning, or with something else, depends on why we care about the meaning of whatever it is we are 
interpreting.”  Michael C. Dorf, Recipe for Trouble: Some Thoughts on Meaning, Translation and 
Normative Theory, 85 Geo LJ 1857, 1858 (1997).   Professor Lawson has elsewhere agreed that the 
answers to at least some interpretative questions are “inescapably normative, depending heavily on the end 
one seeks to serve through interpretation.”  Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, supra note XX, at 860.  It is 
crucial, however, to understand the particular respects in which interpretation, of a constitution or anything 
else, is and is not necessarily a normative enterprise. 
      Propositions about meaning are propositions.  Anything that is true of propositions in general is also 
true of propositions about meaning.  One important truth about propositions is that the proof of any 
proposition requires three elements: principles of admissibility that tell you which considerations count for 
or against a proposition’s truth, principles of significance which tell you how much (relative) weight to give 
 13
 
III.  TAKING JEFFERSON SERIOUSLY: DEFINING THE IMPLEMENTATIONAL TREATY POWER 
   
A.  Avoiding False Starts 
 
The federal treaty power has been the subject of substantial debate from the 
nation’s earliest days to the present.  The framing generation worried about such 
questions as whether the President and a two-thirds majority of the Senate could cede 
some or all of a state’s territory to a foreign power.20  Early twentieth-century thinkers, 
echoing previous debates, wondered whether the treaty power could be used to create 
regulatory laws that are beyond the enumerated legislative powers of Congress.21  
Modern scholars debate whether treaties can override otherwise applicable constitutional 
limitations, such as the prohibition on federal commandeering of state governmental 
                                                                                                                                                 
to different sets of admissible evidence, and standards of proof which tell you how much evidence is 
necessary in order to proclaim the truth value of a proposition. 
      Normative considerations enter at the last stage where one determines the standard of proof or level of 
evidence that is epistemologically required in order to make a declaration of truth.  There is no way to 
separate that determination from the consequences of a truth declaration; the standard of proof appropriate 
to an ivory-tower scholar considering the meaning of the Engagements Clause is not necessarily the same 
as the standard of proof appropriate to the President of the United States deciding whether a certain state of 
affairs justifies the launch of thermonuclear missiles.  But by the same token, the correct principles of 
admissibility and significance for documents are objective facts.  It is possible to monkey around with the 
rules of admissibility and significance for a document such as the Constitution, just as it is possible to 
monkey around with the rules of admissibility and significance for proving ordinary facts about events in 
the world.  The law does it all of the time through rules of evidence.  But to do so is deliberately to sacrifice 
the search for truth in favor of other values.  There may, of course, be many circumstances in which there is 
a good normative case for sacrificing the search for truth about constitutional meaning in favor of other 
values, but the scholarly enterprise is not one of them. 
 
20   See Vasan Kesavan, The Treaty-Making Power and American Federalism: An Originalist Proof for 
Missouri v Holland (unpublished manuscript, Dec. 9, 2001). 
 
21   See id., n.3. 
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processes,22 and whether treaties can extend only to a limited range of subjects that are 
properly a matter for international agreement.23   Overlaying these debates is the 
perennial question whether and when treaties are self-executing--that is, take effect as 
domestic law without legislative implementation.24  And the prevalence of executive 
agreements, with or without congressional approval, raises the additional question 
whether the treaty power is the exclusive mechanism by which the United States can 
make binding international commitments.25 
Historically, the most important of these debates has been whether the federal 
treaty power extends to matters beyond the legislative competence of Congress.  Can the 
President and Senate, by treaty, regulate subjects that the President and Congress, 
                                                 
22   See, e.g., Martin H. Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation?  Federal Power vs. “States Rights” in Foreign 
Affairs, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1277 (1999); Gerald L. Neuman, The Nationalization of Civil Liberties 
Revisited, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1630, 1650-55 (1999). 
 
23   See Robert Anderson IV, “Ascertained in a Different Way”: The Treaty Power at the Crossroads of 
Contract, Compact, and Constitution, 69 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 189 (2001) (arguing that the treaty power is 
limited to provisions resulting from the good-faith negotiations of the parties); Caleb Nelson, The Treaty 
Power and Self-Execution: A Comment on Professor Woolhandler’s Article, 42 Va. J. Int’l L. 801, 812-14 
(2002) (suggesting that treaties that concern only the internal affairs of the treating nations may not 
constitute treaties within the meaning of the Constitution). 
 
24   In 1999, this question was the subject of a 303-page exchange in the pages of the Columbia Law 
Review between John Yoo, who defends the view that at least some treaties are not self –executing, and 
Martin Flaherty and Carlos Vazquez, who defend a stronger vision of self-execution.  Compare John C. 
Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 
Colum. L. Rev. 1955 (1999); John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural 
Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2218 (1999) with Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: 
Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties As “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 Colum. 
L. Rev. 2095 (1999); Carlos Manual Vazquez, Laughing At Treaties, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2154 (1999).  For 
an alternative view that would give self-executing effect only to treaties that do not conflict with existing 
statutory law, see Vasan Kesavan, The Three Tiers of Federal Law (unpublished manuscript, June 4, 2002). 
 
25   This question has prompted modern debates that approach in length, intensity, and variety the recent 
debates on self-execution.  Compare Bruce A. Ackerman & David M. Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 
108 Harv. L. Rev. 799 (1995) (treaties and executive agreements are interchangeable because of an 
unwritten constitutional amendment) with Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: 
Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1221 (1995) (treaties 
and executive agreements are not interchangeable because the Constitution does not contain amendments 
written in invisible ink) with John C. Yoo, Laws As Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-
Executive Agreements, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 757 (2001) (treaties and executive agreements are sometimes 
interchangeable because of contemporary practice). 
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through legislation, cannot?  This question whether there is a precise congruence between 
the jurisdictional scope of the treaty power and the scope of Congress’s legislative power 
was the basis for founding-era objections to treaty provisions dealing with such matters 
as alien ownership of real property.26  It was central to the Southern antebellum critique 
of federal treaties that interfered with Southern regulation of slavery.27  It was the precise 
issue decided by the Supreme Court in Missouri v Holland, which held that Congress 
could implement treaties creating international commitments regarding migratory birds 
even though Congress and the President could not (under then-existing understandings) 
constitutionally regulate that subject under any of the enumerated Article I legislative 
powers.28  In the wake of Holland, the relation between the treaty power and Congress’s 
legislative powers was the subject of the attempt led by Senator John Bricker in the 1950s 
to amend the Constitution, most dramatically by a provision that would have stipulated 
(either as clarification or alteration of the Treaty Clause) that “[a] treaty shall become 
effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation which would be 
valid in the absence of treaty.”29  This question about the relationship between the treaty 
power and the legislative power has been the subject of extensive legal commentary for a 
century.  It is not the precise question that we seek to answer here. 
                                                 
26   See Golove, supra note 10, at 1104-27. 
 
27   See id., 1210-37. 
 
28   252 U.S. 469 (1920).  Today, under modern understandings of Congress’s power to “regulate 
Commerce . . . among the several States,” U.S. Const art I, § 8, cl 3, it is virtually certain that Congress 
would be allowed to pass a statute to protect migratory birds without recourse to a treaty. 
 
29   For a thorough (albeit decidedly unsympathetic) detailing of the progress, and near-passage, of the 
Bricker Amendment, see Duane Tananbaum, The Bricker Amendment Controversy: A Test of 
Eisenhower’s Political Leadership (1988). 
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We consider this question to be a non-starter, as there is no plausible reason to 
suppose that the treaty power can extend only to subjects within Congress’s enumerated 
powers.  Vasan Kesavan has endeavored to demonstrate that at least one universally 
accepted function of treaties -- the cession of territory to another country, generally as 
part of a treaty of peace -- is beyond the enumerated powers of Congress.30  A much 
simpler example, however, is readily available: Congress does not have the power to end 
a war, but the President and the Senate can formalize the end of a war by treaty.  
Congress, of course, can effectively end a war by refusing to fund the war effort, but it has 
no formal power, either internationally or domestically, to terminate a war.31  Thus, if the 
debate really focuses on whether the Constitution’s presidential/senatorial treaty-making 
power is precisely coextensive with the congressional/presidential lawmaking power, it is 
much ado about nothing. 
This long-standing focus on whether the treaty power and the legislative power 
are congruent is a distraction.  We focus on a broader and more fundamental question: is 
the treaty power jurisdictional, in the sense that it describes a distinctive area of federal 
competence independent of other grants of enumerated power, or implementational, in 
the sense that treaties are only permitted to carry into effect other exercises of enumerated 
national power?  Thomas Jefferson said the latter, and Thomas Jefferson was right. 
 
B.  The Ties That Bind 
                                                 
30   See Kesavan, supra note XX. 
 
31   See Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Art of War under the Constitution, 95 Dickinson L. Rev. 557, 562-
65 (1991); John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War 
Powers, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 167, 265 (1996).  Congress could enact a statute declaring peace, and perhaps that 
statute would have domestic consequences if other statutes are contingently triggered by such a legislative 
declaration, but the declaration does not end the war in any meaningful legal sense. 
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 Before we present Jefferson’s theory, however, we must first identify the 
distinctive nature of treaties.  What can one do through treaties that cannot be done by 
some other legal act?  The answer is that domestic legislation cannot legally bind either 
foreign sovereigns or future American governmental actors.  Congress can, within its 
constitutional authority, bind citizens, states, and the national government.  It can even 
create legal rights in foreign governments and give those foreign governments 
enforcement power in American courts.  But Congress cannot regulate foreign sovereigns 
or prevent itself or future Congresses from altering statutory rights granted to foreign 
governments.  For those tasks, the nation needs treaties: legally binding consensual 
arrangements between or among sovereigns. 
Suppose that the United States and France want to enter into an agreement 
providing for reciprocal duty-free entry of perfumes.  Congress can pass a law exempting 
French perfumes from all American duties.  But if Congress later changes that law, the 
French government would have no legal recourse.  The French government could change 
its own domestic law, make diplomatic hay, begin a trade war, or even throw legality to 
the wind and begin a shooting war, but the American action would not violate any legal 
norm.  If, however, the arrangement is embodied in a treaty, then subsequent legislation 
contrary to the terms of the treaty would violate international law.  Congress could still 
pass legislation in violation of the treaty that would be fully effective as a matter of 
domestic law; the treaty does not constitutionally disable Congress.  But a treaty that 
“locks in” an international agreement raises the cost of such legislation by whatever 
amount a violation of international law is considered or expected to entail.  Similarly, a 
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treaty, and only a treaty, can secure an internationally-binding agreement from a foreign 
sovereign. 
Treaties are thus an essential means for implementing national powers in the 
international arena.  The Sweeping Clause permits Congress to execute national powers 
domestically (provided that such executory laws are “necessary and proper”).  The Treaty 
Clause similarly permits the United States, through the President and the Senate, to 
implement national powers internationally by locking in intergovernmental agreements. 
 
C.  Jefferson Speaks 
 
 At least, locking in intergovernmental agreements is the most minimal function of 
the Treaty Clause.  It is another matter altogether to say that it is the maximal or only 
function.  Thomas Jefferson took that next step.32  Jefferson succinctly expressed his 
constitutional view of treaties in a manual on parliamentary practice that he wrote for the 
Senate while he was Vice President: 
By the Constitution of the United States, this department of legislation is confined 
to two branches only, of the ordinary Legislature; the President originating, and 
Senate having a negative.  To what subject this power extends, has not been 
defined in detail by the Constitution; nor are we entirely agreed among ourselves.  
                                                 
32   Jefferson was, at least much of the time, deeply suspicious of the federal treaty power’s scope and 
exercise.  Although some scholars allege that various aspects of his views on the treaty power reflected a 
dominant founding-era consensus, others powerfully (and persuasively) disagree.Compare Curtis A. 
Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 390, 415-16 (1998) (claiming that 
Jefferson’s views were widely held); George A. Finch, The Need to Restrain the Treaty-Making Power of 
the United States Within Constitutional Limits, 48 Am. J. Int’l L. 57, 61 (1954) (same) with Golove, supra 
note XX, at 1188 (arguing that Jefferson’s views were idiosyncratic).  One need not be an historian to sense 
that Professor Golove has much the better of this argument; even a casual reading of founding-era materials 
shows that Jefferson’s view commanded something very far from a consensus.  For our purposes, however, 
it does not matter which view of Jefferson and his contemporaries is correct.  Our goal is to determine 
whether Jefferson’s view is, all things considered, the reading of the Treaty Clauses that would have been 
adopted by a reasonable observer in possession of all relevant knowledge, not whether it actually 
commanded a clear majority of his contemporaries. 
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1.  It is admitted that it must Concern the foreign nation, party to the contract, or it 
would be a mere nullity res inter alias acta.  2.  By the general power to make 
treaties, the Constitution must have intended to comprehend only those objects 
which are usually regulated by treaty, and cannot be otherwise regulated.  3.  It 
must have meant to except out of these the rights reserved to the States; for surely 
the President and Senate cannot do by treaty what the whole government is 
interdicted from doing in any way.  4.  And also to except those subjects of 
legislation in which it gave a participation to the House of Representatives.  This 
last exception is denied by some, on the ground that it would leave very little 
matter for the treaty power to work on.  The less the better, say others.33 
 
This passage obviously reflects Jefferson’s hostility to treaties,34 and it would be rash to 
read it as a general expression of the sentiments of the Senate -- or indeed as a general 
expression of anything other than Jefferson’s hostility to treaties.  Nonetheless, it contains 
some important suggestions for restrictions on the treaty power that merit examination. 
 Jefferson’s first proposed restriction on the treaty power -- that treaties must 
genuinely concern foreign nations -- is not as obviously sound as it may seem.  Jefferson 
was no doubt imagining a putative “treaty” that is in fact simply an attempt to perform an 
end-run around the Article I legislative process by having a foreign collaborator help 
construct domestic legislation through the formalities of a treaty.  Even many modern 
advocates of a broad treaty power share some of these concerns about phony treaties.35  
The Constitution only prohibits such arrangements, however, if the collaborative 
agreement falls outside the boundaries of the term “treaty” as it appears in the 
Constitution.  That is, if an entirely one-sided affair, in which one party simply uses the 
                                                 
33   Thomas Jefferson, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice for the Use of the Senate of the United States, in 
Jefferson’s Parliamentary Writings 353, 420-21 (Wilbur Samuel Howell ed., 1988). 
 
34   See supra note XX.  It also identifies the President as a branch of the legislature, which does not speak 
well of Jefferson’s acumen as a constitutional interpreter.  Fortunately, we do not invoke Jefferson as an 
authority but instead independently examine whether his views of the treaty power are correct. 
 
35   See Flaherty, supra note XX, at 1306 (“Few would dispute that requirement, early on articulated by 
Thomas Jefferson, that treaties not be pretextual”); Golove, supra note XX, at 1090 n.41; Louis Henkin, 
The Constitution, Treaties, and International Human Rights, 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1012, 1024-25 (1968). 
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form of a treaty to alter its domestic law, would not even count as a “treaty” for 
constitutional purposes, then Jefferson was right to doubt the validity of such agreements.  
Otherwise, it is hard to see why a treaty, if it really is a treaty, is unenforceable simply 
because it is a bad deal -- or even a subterfuge.  The Constitution lays down certain 
formal rules for accomplishing certain ends, and if those formal rules are followed, the 
procedure is legal unless there is some substantive limitation on the scope of the granted 
power.36  A properly executed treaty is legally binding unless it either is not a treaty or it 
exceeds some limitation on the scope of the treaty power that is implicit in the 
constitutional structure -- which brings us to the rest of Jefferson’s analysis. 
 Jefferson’s second and fourth limitations -- that treaties cannot concern matters 
that could “otherwise be regulated” or matters in which the Constitution “gave a 
participation to the House of Representatives” -- are closely related; both suggest that 
treaties cannot serve as substitutes for legislation.  According to Jefferson, where the 
Constitution authorizes regulation by (bicameral) legislation, regulation by treaty is 
implicitly forbidden.  The only sphere of application for treaties, on this understanding, is 
subjects that cannot be regulated by legislation, which would obviously include the 
intergovernmental “lock in” function that cannot be accomplished by legislation. 
But what if certain subjects -- for instance, regulation of marriage or local land 
use -- are beyond the enumerated legislative powers of Congress?  Obviously, it would 
not trench upon the prerogatives of Congress or the House to permit treaties to regulate 
such subjects, because there would be no prerogatives upon which to trench.  Just as 
obviously, it would essentially constitute the federal government as a general 
                                                 
36   On the importance of constitutional form, even at the expense of substance, see Vasan Kesavan & 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 291 (2002). 
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government; anything outside the legislative powers of Congress would be within the 
treaty powers of the President and Senate.  That is why Jefferson added his final 
limitation on the treaty power: the Constitution “must have meant to except out of these 
[treaty powers] the rights reserved to the States; surely the President and Senate cannot 
do by treaty what the whole government is interdicted from doing in any way.”  That is, 
according to Jefferson, treaties cannot reach subjects that are not within some other 
enumerated federal power. 
Together, Jefferson’s limitations describe a treaty power that is purely 
implementational: it can carry into effect enumerated federal powers by extending them 
into the international arena in legally binding fashion, but it cannot regulate on its own 
initiative. 
In an 1803 letter to Wilson Cary Nicholas, Jefferson repeated and elaborated this 
thesis: 
If [the Treaty Clause] has bounds they can be no others than the definitions of the 
powers which that instrument gives.  It specifies & delineates the operations 
permitted to the federal government, and gives all the powers necessary to carry 
these into execution.  Whatever of these enumerated objects is proper for a law, 
Congress may make the law; whatever is proper to be executed by way of a treaty, 
the President & Senate may enter into the treaty; whatever is to be done by a 
judicial sentence, the judges may pass the sentence.37 
 
That which is “proper to be executed by way of a treaty” is to make domestic law 
internationally binding or to secure binding commitments from foreign sovereigns.  
Under a Jeffersonian understanding of treaties, that “lock-in” function is all that treaties 
may properly accomplish.  A treaty could, for instance, execute a legislated trade 
agreement by entering into legally binding relations with a foreign government (or by 
                                                 
37   Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas, Sept. 7, 1803, in 8 The Writings of Thomas 
Jefferson 247 n.1 (Paul L. Ford, ed., 1897). 
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setting up a framework that is triggered by subsequent legislation), but a treaty could not 
itself establish the terms of trade apart from legislation. 
The treaty power, as described by Jefferson more than 200 years ago, is a vehicle 
for implementing otherwise-granted national powers in the international arena.  It may be 
used to carry into effect national powers found in the Constitution,38 but it cannot 
function as a free-standing power, divorced from connection to the exercise of some other 
enumerated power.  In this respect, the Treaty Clause is analogous to the Sweeping 
Clause of Article I: the Sweeping Clause permits Congress to implement otherwise-
granted national powers domestically, while the treaty power permits the President and 
Senate to implement otherwise-granted national powers internationally by entering into 
agreements with foreign sovereigns. 
A close look at the Constitution’s text and structure points, even if somewhat 
crookedly, to such an implementational reading of the Treaty Clause.  We must, however, 
ask for patience during that close look; the argument will take some time to construct. 
 
IV.  TAKING TEXT SERIOUSLY: UNCOMFORTABLE TRUTHS ABOUT THE TREATY CLAUSE 
 
 Start with some genuinely incontrovertible facts about the constitutional text.  
First, the power to make treaties is jointly vested in the President and the Senate: the 
                                                 
38   Importantly, the powers implemented by the Treaty Clause need not be Article I powers of Congress.  
The implementational view permits the treaty power to effectuate all powers of all federal institutions.  Just 
as the Sweeping Clause permits Congress to pass legislation to implement its own granted powers “and all 
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or 
Officer thereof,” the treaty power, on this Jeffersonian understanding, permits treaty-makers to carry into 
execution presidential and judicial powers, as well as powers vested in individual officers (such as the Vice 
President’s power to preside over the Senate or the Chief Justice’s power to preside over presidential 
impeachments). 
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President can “make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur . . . .”39  
Thus, as with the Article I lawmaking power that is shared among the President, the 
Senate, and the House,40 the Constitution commits the treaty power to a combination of 
actors. 
 Second, the Constitution specifically denies to the states any treaty-making 
power: “No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation.”41  States may, 
with the consent of Congress, “enter into an[] agreement or Compact . . . with a foreign 
Power,”42 but not even the consent of Congress can authorize a state treaty. 
 Third, federal treaties, including treaties validly made by the Confederation 
government, are “the supreme Law of the Land”43 and accordingly, by the plain terms of 
the Supremacy Clause, take precedence over state statutes or state constitutions.  Under 
standard conflict-of-laws doctrine, they are also held to take precedence over prior 
inconsistent federal statutes, though that conclusion is subject to serious question as a 
matter of original meaning.44 
 Fourth, the First Amendment does not apply to the Treaty Power.  This statement, 
unlike the prior three statements, is likely to seem jarring to modern eyes, but it is as 
                                                 
39   The treaty-making power is not the only power vested in that particular combination of institutions.  
The President and Senate also share the power of appointment of principal officers of the United States 
(and of inferior officers if Congress does not vest their appointment elsewhere).  See U.S. Const art II, § 2, 
cl 2.  In the case of treaties, however, two thirds of the Senate must approve, while a majority of the Senate 
is enough to consent to a presidential appointment. 
 
40   See id. art. I, § 7, cls 2-3. 
 
41   Id. art I, § 10, cl 1. 
 
42   Id. art I, § 10, cl 3. 
 
43   Id. art VI, cl 2. 
 
44   On standard doctrine, see Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 88 Va. L. Rev. 225 (2002).  On original meaning, 
see Kesavan, The Three Tiers of Federal Law, supra note XX. 
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textually certain as is anything in the Constitution.  The First Amendment says that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government, for a redress of 
grievances.”45  The President and Senate are not Congress, and the First Amendment by 
its unmistakable terms applies only to Congress.  If a treaty requires congressional 
implementation for its full effect, then of course Congress could not enact implementing 
legislation in violation of the First Amendment, but the treaty itself is simply beyond the 
terms of the amendment.46 
 Modern law, of course, applies the First Amendment to the President, the courts, 
and the states,47 and a fortiori to the federal treaty-making authority, but that is a textually 
indefensible maneuver.  To read the First Amendment to apply to entities other than 
Congress is simply to abandon the enterprise of constitutional interpretation. 
Of course, there may be constitutional provisions that apply to non-congressional 
actors that have much the same effect as the First Amendment, so that little damage is 
done by acting as though the First Amendment applies to other entities, but that is a 
matter to be explored case by case.  For instance, it is likely that the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from (at least 
discriminatorily) abridging rights of speech, religion, and assembly.48  One can 
                                                 
45   U.S. Const amend 1 (emphasis added). 
 
46   Cf. Nelson, supra note XX, at 811-12 (noting that the First Amendment, by its terms, seems not to apply 
to treaties). 
 
47   See Daniel A. Farber, The First Amendment 1 (1998). 
 
48   “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States.”  U.S. Const amend XIV, § 1.  For the proposition that the Privileges or Immunities 
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metaphorically describe this as “applying the First Amendment to the states,” but the 
First Amendment itself does not apply to the states as a matter of original meaning. 
 Similarly, the First Amendment by its terms does not apply to executive and 
judicial action.  That conclusion is not as significant as it might seem at first glance, for 
the simple reason that presidents and courts are not in a position to threaten rights of 
speech, religion, or assembly in the same manner as is Congress.  Congress, of course, is 
not granted any enumerated power to regulate speech, religion, or assembly, and the First 
Amendment was accordingly simply repeating limits on the lawmaking power that were 
already contained in the original constitutional structure.49  Nonetheless, one can readily 
imagine that Congress might try to misuse its authority under the Sweeping Clause to 
implement federal powers through methods that implicate rights of speech or religion, 
such as by banning criticism of import laws in order to maximize their effectiveness.  
These laws, if enacted, would not be “necessary and proper” for effectuating federal 
powers, and Congress accordingly never had any enumerated constitutional authority to 
enact them, but it is easy to understand why people in 1791 might have worried about the 
prospect.  (Those people had good cause to worry, of course, as seven years later 
congressional Federalists invoked the Sweeping Clause as authorization for the Sedition 
                                                                                                                                                 
Clause protects some First Amendment rights against discriminatory state action, see John Harrison, 
Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 Yale L.J. 1385 (1992).  For the proposition that 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause may also protect some First Amendment rights against even 
nondiscriminatory state action, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 
101 Yale L.J. 1193 (1992). 
 
49   As one Federalist pamphleteer put it in 1788: “examine the plan [of the Constitution], and you will find 
that the liberty of the press and the laws of Mahomet are equally affected by it.”  Hugh Williamson, 
Remarks on the New Plan of Government (1788), reprinted in Bernard Schwartz, 1 The Bill of Rights: A 
Documentary History 550, 551 (Chelsea House Publishers, 1971).  For other expressions of this view by 
prominent founding-era figures, see Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal 
Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke L.J. 267, 318-19 (1993). 
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Act of 1798.50)  The First Amendment was designed to quell concerns about such 
exercises of congressional power by confirming that Congress has no enumerated power, 
express or implied, to abridge freedom of speech or religion, regulate the establishment 
of religion, etc., in the course of implementing federal powers.  There is no presidential 
power that poses an equivalent threat to free speech or religion.  The President has 
various executive and war-making powers, but none of those powers remotely would 
justify presidential action, in the absence of statute, restricting speech or religion in 
domestic territory.  There is accordingly nothing for the First Amendment to clarify with 
respect to presidential power, because there is no perceptible danger.51  Courts, of course, 
can take actions that implicate speech, such as entering libel judgments or issuing 
protective orders, but no one in 1791 would have imagined that those actions, in the 
ordinary course of carrying out “[t]he judicial Power,” raise any constitutional issues.  
One can imagine out-of-control judges issuing bizarre orders, but such action would so 
                                                 
50   See David Jenkins, The Sedition Act of 1798 and the Incorporation of Seditious Libel into First 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 45 Am. J. Legal Hist. 154, 178-83 (2001) (discussing the role of the Sweeping 
Clause in debates over the constitutionality of the Sedition Act); Lawson & Granger, supra note XX, at 
275-76 (describing how the Federalists misconstrued the Sweeping Clause in these debates). 
 
51   The other provisions of the Bill of Rights present a more complicated story.  Amendments 2-8 do not 
make specific reference to Congress.  Indeed, they do not even make specific reference to the federal 
government, though Chief Justice John Marshall was surely correct to conclude in Barron v Baltimore, 32 
U.S. (7 Pet.) 242, 250 (1833), that the context of the Bill of Rights demonstrates that it does not limit state 
governments.  It makes sense that those other amendments are not limited to Congress, because they deal 
with subjects that implicate potential abuses of the executive or judicial power.  The Second Amendment, 
which protects the right to keep and bear arms, limits Congress but also prevents the President from 
disarming the militia through his power as military commander-in-chief.  Similarly, the Third Amendment, 
which limits the quartering of soldiers, also obviously addresses the President’s power over the military.  
The Fourth Amendment’s requirement of reasonable searches and seizures constricts the President’s power 
to execute the laws, and the requirement of probable cause for warrants limits the judicial power to 
immunize executive agents from civil suits.  The Fifth Amendment’s criminal process provisions clearly 
constrain the executive’s prosecutorial power and the judicial power to compel testimony through contempt 
orders. The Due Process Clause is paradigmatically a restriction on arbitrary executive or judicial action.  
The Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Amendments all target potential abuses of the judicial process.  The only 
exceptional provision may be the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is perhaps the most 
difficult provision in the Bill of Rights to explicate.  For our trepidatious expedition into the Takings 
Clause swamp, see Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Taking Notes: Subpoenas and Just Compensation, 66 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1081 (1999). 
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blatantly exceed “[t]he judicial Power” that no clarifying or confirming amendment was 
necessary.52 
The simple fact is that the First Amendment by its terms does not apply to 
executive or judicial actions, though of course it does limit congressional action that 
seeks to “carry into Execution” executive or judicial action.  That fact may be out of step 
with modern sensibilities, but it is a fact nonetheless.  The same is true of treaties: the 
First Amendment by its express terms simply does not apply to treaties, though it applies 
to congressional legislation implementing treaties.  If a treaty that commits the United 
States to restrictions on speech or religion is unconstitutional, it must be unconstitutional 
for reasons other than the First Amendment. 
For identical reasons, at least some of the prohibitions on federal action in Article 
I, section 9 of the Constitution do not apply to the treaty power.  The first, and to an 
eighteenth-century observer the most important, of those prohibitions states that “[t]he 
Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think 
proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand 
eight hundred and eight . . . .”53  This provision was specifically exempted from the 
Article V amendment process until its own internal time limit ran its course.54  In other 
words, Congress could not--and unamendably could not--forbid the importation of slaves 
for twenty years after ratification of the Constitution.  The prohibition, however, by its 
terms applies only to Congress.  This provision stands in stark contrast to another 
                                                 
52   Judges are also subject to review on appeal and through impeachment.  See Lawson, supra note XX, at 
227-28. 
 
53   U.S. Const art I, § 9, cl 1 (emphasis added). 
 
54   See id. art V (“no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and 
eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article.”). 
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provision of Article I, section 9, which states that “[n]o Title of Nobility shall be granted 
by the United States . . . .”55  This provision by its terms applies to any action taken on 
behalf of the United States, which presumably would include treaties.56  In any event, it is 
clear that the Slave Trade Clause only restricts Congress. 
To pose a question that will loom large later in our story: Does that mean that in 
1789, the President and Senate could have entered into a treaty that mutually forbade the 
importation of slaves into the signatory countries and thus immediately ended the slave 
trade, despite the fact that the combined forces of Congress, the President, and the Article 
V amending authorities could not do so?  If the answer is “yes,” the Treaty Clause is a 
more extraordinary provision than anyone, including the founding-era opponents of 
slavery, has thus far noticed.  If the answer is “no,” it must be by virtue of something in 
the Constitution other than Article I, section 9. 
 Fifth, and finally, the Treaty Clause is located in Article II of the Constitution--the 
Article that primarily describes and empowers the federal government’s executive 
institutions.  The location of provisions in the Constitution, of course, is not an infallible 
guide to their characterization.  Article I, section 4, clause 3 gives the Vice President 
power to preside over the Senate and to cast tie-breaking votes in that body, but although 
the grant appears in Article I, it is not, strictly speaking, a grant of legislative power, for 
the simple reason that the Constitution itself specifies that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein 
                                                 
55   Id. art I, § 9, cl 8 (emphasis added). 
 
56   As for the other Article I, section 9 prohibitions that do not make specific reference to congressional 
actions, one could plausibly say either that the absence of such reference makes them generally applicable 
to all federal action or that the specific reference to “the United States” in the Nobility Clause demands the 
opposite inference.  The placement of these provisions in Article I does not create a presumption that they 
apply only to Congress because some of them, such as the prohibition on withdrawal of funds without an 
appropriation, id. art I, § 9, cl 7, are clearly aimed at executive and judicial actors. 
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granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate 
and House of Representatives.”57  The Senate, in turn, “shall be composed of two 
Senators from each State,” which means that the Vice President is not technically a 
member of the Senate and therefore cannot share in the Senate’s legislative powers.58  
Similarly, even though Article I, section 7 gives the President a vital role in the 
lawmaking process, the President’s presentment power cannot be considered “legislative” 
for purposes of the Constitution, because the President is not Congress and only Congress 
can exercise “legislative” power within the meaning of the Constitution.  Whether one 
wants to call these non-congressional Article I powers of the President and Vice 
President “quasi-legislative” or some new term invented just for the occasion, such as 
“legisecutive,” is a matter of taste, so long as one does not call them “legislative.”  For 
the same reasons, the Senate’s roles in the treaty-making and appointment processes do 
not make senators executive actors for purposes of the Constitution, because the 
“executive Power” is vested in the President alone.  The Constitution’s division of power 
reflects a real-world political compromise rather than a theoretically pure conception of 
separated powers; one must take the Constitution’s definitions and allocations of power 
as one finds them without attempting to force them into a prefabricated mold.59 
Nonetheless, the basic Article I-Article II-Article III/legislative-executive-judicial 
structure of the Constitution is hard to miss.  Indeed, it is perhaps the Constitution’s most 
obvious structural feature.  The “legisecutive” lawmaking powers of the President and 
                                                 
57   Id. art I, § 1, cl 1. 
 
58   Id. art I, § 3, cl 1.  It also means, inter alia, that two-thirds of the Senate cannot expel the Vice President.  
See id. art I, § 5, cl 2 (“[e]ach House may . . . , with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member”). 
 
59   Theoretical conceptions, of course, are important because they help define otherwise ambiguous terms 
and provide the background conventions against which the Constitution’s compromise was constructed. 
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Vice President no doubt appear in Article I because, although they are not technically 
legislative powers within the meaning of the Constitution, they more closely resemble 
legislative powers than they do any of the other three basic categories of governmental 
power.  The Treaty Clause, by contrast, is in Article II.  What, if anything, are we to 
make of this placement? 
 Of course, once we begin to consider the implications of the Treaty Clause’s 
location in Article II, we quickly leave the realm of incontrovertible textual facts and 
enter the world of highly controvertible structural inferences.  Structural inference is a 
legitimate and powerful tool of interpretation.  The power of judicial review, for instance, 
is the product of inference about the scope and character of the “judicial Power” rather 
than direct textual expression.60  Perhaps questions about the treaty power find their 
answers in the same sources. 
 
V.  TAKING STRUCTURE SERIOUSLY: THE TREATY POWER AS AN EXECUTIVE POWER 
 
There are two textual features of the Treaty Clause that we omitted from the prior 
section.  First, the Treaty Clause reads like a positive grant of power to the President and 
Senate, similar to the grants of legislative power in Article I.   Second, the text of the 
Treaty Clause contains no evident internal limitations on the scope of its granted 
authority.  An informed eighteenth-century audience, after weighing all relevant 
considerations, would have concluded that both of these features are in fact illusions: the 
Treaty Clause is not a grant of power to the President and the Senate, and it contains quite 
                                                 
60   See John Harrison, The Constitutional Origins and Implications of Judicial Review, 84 Va. L. Rev. 333 
(1998). 
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significant internal limitations.  Later, we will explain why the apparent absence of 
internal textual limitations in the Treaty Clause is an illusion.  First, we dispose of the 
myth that the Treaty Clause is a grant of power to the President. 
If the Treaty Clause appeared in Article I of the Constitution, there is little doubt 
that it would constitute an affirmative grant of power to both the President and the 
Senate.  The Treaty Clause, however, appears in Article II.  Enumerations of power in 
Article II do not serve the same constitutional function as do enumerations of power in 
Article I.  The President’s Article II powers stem from the Vesting Clause of Article II, 
which vests the “executive Power . . . in a President.”  All other enumerations in Article 
II clarify, qualify, or explicate the basic power grant in the Article II Vesting Clause.  
This principle is the key to the meaning of the Treaty Clause, and it is controversial 
enough to require an extended discussion.  That discussion must begin with an analysis of 
the constitutional provisions that surround Article II: the Article I and Article III 
provisions that empower the federal legislature and judiciary. 
 
A.  Vested Power As Granted Power 
 
 1.  A Tale of Two Articles: Legislative and Judicial Vesting 
 
Consider the structure of Article I of the Constitution.  The first section of Article 
I states in full: “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the 
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”61  Sections 
                                                 
61   U.S. Const, art I, § 1. 
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2 and 3 describe qualities and procedures of the House and Senate as individual bodies.  
Section 4 discusses election and assembly procedures for Congress and grants Congress 
power to “make or alter”62 state election rules for the federal legislature.  Section 5 
concerns powers and procedures of the respective houses of Congress, Section 6 
describes prerogatives of and limitations on individual members of Congress, and Section 
7 describes the process for making laws.  Section 8 specifies that “[t]he Congress shall 
have Power” to engage in roughly two dozen activities spread through eighteen clauses.  
Section 9 identifies specific limitations on congressional power, and Section 10 describes 
limitations on states, some of which include provisions for congressional consent to or 
revision of state action.  Other congressional powers can be found in various places in 
Articles II-V. 
The language and structure of Article I, in conjunction with the rest of the 
Constitution, establish the role of the initial sentence in Article I.  This provision, known 
as the “Article I Vesting Clause,” defines the institution of Congress, but it does not grant 
any powers to Congress, and in particular it does not grant to Congress all powers that 
would have been understood as “legislative” by an informed eighteenth-century audience.  
Instead, it specifies that Congress – defined as the House and Senate – is the sole 
institution vested with, and thus charged with exercising, whatever subset of the universe 
of “legislative” powers are “herein granted” elsewhere in the Constitution.  In order to 
know precisely what are those “legislative Powers” that are vested in Congress, one must 
read the rest of the Constitution beyond the Vesting Clause. 
                                                 
62   Id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any 
time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as the Places of chusing Senators”). 
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The specific enumerations of congressional power found in the Constitution, 
many of which take the form of “Congress shall have Power to . . . ,” are thus exactly 
what they appear to be on casual inspection: grants of power to the institution defined in 
the Article I Vesting Clause.  That Vesting Clause designates the holder of certain powers 
conferred by the Constitution but it does not grant those powers.  Article I thus has a 
recognizable structure: it begins with a Vesting Clause that defines but does not empower 
an institution of government and then uses specific power grants to define that 
institution’s jurisdiction. 
Consider now the structure of Article III.  As does Article I, Article III begins 
with a vesting clause: “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish.”63  After describing the characteristics of federal judicial officers,64 Article 
III goes on to say that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend”65 to nine categories of disputes.  
Other provisions in Article III limit the judicial power by prescribing trial by jury for 
criminal cases66 and by defining the offense of, and methods of proof for, treason,67 but 
nothing else in Article III even arguably grants any power to the federal courts68 (though 
at least one provision in Article III grants power to Congress69). 
                                                 
63   U.S. Const. art. III § 1. 
 
64   See id. (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good 
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be 
diminished during their Continuance in Office.”). 
 
65   Id. art. III, § 2. 
 
66   Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
 
67   Id. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. 
 
68   The Appointments Clause in Article II authorizes federal courts to receive the power to appoint inferior 
federal officers if Congress chooses to grant that authority by statute, see id. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and the Chief 
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The Article III Vesting Clause, unlike the Article I Vesting Clause, functions as a 
grant of power to the federal courts.  The considerations that lead to this conclusion have 
been developed in a series of now-classic articles by Professor Steven Calabresi, alone 
and in conjunction with Professor Saikrishna Prakash and Kevin Rhodes.70  Those 
considerations turn out to be critical for understanding the structure of Article II, so they 
are worth fleshing out here. 
First, the language of the Article III Vesting Clause – “[t]he judicial Power shall 
be vested” – strongly supports a power-grant reading.  “It is very hard to read a clause 
that speaks of vesting power in a particular actor as doing anything other than vesting 
power in a particular actor.”71  If the Article I Vesting Clause said that “[a]ll legislative 
Powers shall be vested in a Congress,” it would be similarly difficult to avoid reading that 
clause as a grant of power to Congress.  The Article I Vesting Clause, however, vests in 
Congress only those legislative powers “herein granted,” which specifically directs us 
                                                                                                                                                 
Justice is granted the power(and duty) to preside over presidential impeachment trials.  See id. Art. I, § 3, 
cl. 6. 
 
69   See id. Art. III, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason”).  
Conventional wisdom holds that Congress is also granted power by the so-called Exceptions Clause, which 
states that in all cases in which the Supreme Court does not have constitutionally-prescribed original 
jurisdiction, “the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such 
Exceptions, and under such Regulations, as the Congress shall make.”  Id. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.  In fact, 
however, this provision simply references Congress’s power over the Supreme Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction.  That power stems from the Sweeping Clause, not from the Exceptions Clause, which grants 
no power to Congress.  For an exhaustive demonstration of this basic point, see David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic 
Limits of Congress’ Power Regarding the Judicial Branch, 1999 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 75. 
 
70   See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural 
Judiciary, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153 (1992); Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 
Nw. U.L. Rev. 1377 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to 
Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 572-74 (1994).  For additional elaboration, see Gary Lawson & 
Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1267, 1281-
82 (1996); Saikrishna B. Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 70; 
Kevin H. Rhodes, A Structure without Foundation: A Reply to Professor Froomkin, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 
1406 (1994). 
  
71   Lawson & Moore, supra note XX, at 1281. 
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beyond the Vesting Clause for the definition of the granted powers.  There is no 
comparable language in the Article III Vesting Clause that would lead one to look beyond 
the clause itself for the definition of the federal judiciary’s power. 
Second, as Professor Calabresi has discussed at some length, the dictionary 
meanings of the verbs “vest” and “extend” – from the eighteenth century onward -- 
strongly indicate that the Article III Vesting Clause grants power while Section 2 of 
Article III describes the sphere of application of that power.72  As Professor Calabresi has 
noted, “the verb ‘vest’ (derived from the word vestment with its connotations of royal 
and ecclesiastical authority and clothing) seems to refer in this context to placing 
authority in the control of the supreme and inferior courts.  Put another way, it ‘clothes’ 
them with the authority to act.”73  Again, there is no “herein granted” language in the 
Article III Vesting Clause that might lead one to question this reading. 
Third, the uses in the Constitution of the word “vest” in provisions other than the 
three vesting clauses strongly support the power-grant reading of the Article III Vesting 
Clause.  The Sweeping Clause gives Congress power to pass laws “necessary and proper 
for carrying into Execution . . . all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”74  There is no 
way to read this provision as anything but a reference to powers actually granted to 
various federal actors or institutions.75  Similarly, the Appointments Clause provides that 
                                                 
72   See Calabresi, supra note XX, at 1380-81. 
 
73   Id. at 1381. 
 
74   U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added). 
 
75   There is some ambiguity about exactly who those actors and institutions might be.  It is clear enough in 
what circumstances the Constitution vests authority in an “Officer” of the United States: the Vice President 
is given power to preside over the Senate and to cast tie-breaking votes in that body, see id. art. I, § 3, cl. 4; 
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“Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think 
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”76  
This clearly describes a circumstance in which Congress grants power to the named 
actors.  It is conceivable, of course, that the Article III Vesting Clause uses the word 
“vest” in a manner entirely different from the usages in other constitutional provisions 
and from established dictionary meanings, but that seems far less likely than the contrary. 
Fourth, and finally, if the Article III Vesting Clause does not grant power to the 
federal courts, it is hard to see what other clause in the Constitution does so.  Professor 
Michael Froomkin has argued that the federal courts’ power to decide cases (and 
presumably whatever ancillary powers accompany that more basic power77) can be 
derived from Section 2’s provision “extend[ing]” the judicial power to specific disputes.78  
                                                                                                                                                 
the Chief Justice is given power to preside over presidential impeachments, see id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6; and 
department heads may receive authority from Congress to appoint inferior officers, see id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  
It is less clear what the Sweeping Clause means by a “Department.”  Does that refer to congressionally-
created executive departments, such as the Department of State or the Department of War?  This seems 
unlikely, because the Constitution nowhere grants any power directly to a department so defined (though 
the Appointments Clause permits heads of such departments to appoint inferior officers if Congress so 
directs).  The better view is that the word “Department” in this context means one of the three primary units 
of government in whom the Constitution itself vests considerable powers: the Congress, the President, and 
the federal judiciary.  That is in fact the standard usage of the word “department” in the founding era, see 
Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note XX, at 1156 n.6, though certainly not the exclusive one (as the 
Appointments Clause demonstrates).  The most problematic portion of the Sweeping Clause is the 
reference to powers vested in “the Government of the United States.”  There are no powers vested by the 
Constitution in “the Government of the United States” as a unitary entity; all power grants are addressed to 
specific institutions or actors.  The best reading of that phrase is thus something like “other principal 
institutions of the Government of the United States,” which would cover the individual Houses of 
Congress, which are neither “Department[s]” nor “Officer[s]” but which are granted significant powers that 
it makes sense for Congress to be able to effectuate by statute.  See Gary Lawson, Burning Down the 
House (and Senate): A Presentment Requirement for Legislative Subpoenas under the Orders, Resolutions, 
and Votes Clause, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1373, 1386 (2005). 
 
76   U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 
77   See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Power of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 
Iowa L. Rev. 735 (2001). 
 
78   See A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency’s New Vestments, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1346 (1994); 
A. Michael Froomkin, Still Naked After All These Words, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev.  1420 (1994). 
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Thus, he says, even in the absence of the Article III Vesting Clause, one could still infer 
the existence of a “judicial Power” from the fact that such a power “extends” to various 
disputes.  Perhaps one could make such an inference, but it seems more plausible to say 
that without the Article III Vesting Clause, the judicial power would have to stem from 
congressional statutes under the Sweeping Clause rather than from anything in the 
Constitution itself.  It would be passing strange in a constitution of limited and 
enumerated powers to infer something as basic as a constitutionally-granted judicial 
power.  In any event, given that the actual Constitution contains the Article III Vesting 
Clause, and given that the actual provision in Article III, Section 2 “extends” that power, 
it makes much more sense to read the Vesting Clause as the grant of power and Section 2 
as a demarcation of the boundaries of  -- i.e., a limitation on or clarification of  – that 
power. 
Taking all of these arguments into consideration, the case for reading the Article 
III Vesting Clause as a grant of power to the federal courts is overwhelming.  Indeed, 
because the Article III Vesting Clause refers generally to the “judicial Power” rather than 
to the “judicial Power herein granted,” the federal courts receive everything that would 
have fallen within an informed eighteenth-century understanding of judicial power.  The 
jurisdictional provisions in Article III, section 2 then define the classes of disputes in 
which that “judicial Power” can be applied.  Section 2 thus serves as a limitation on the 
judicial power rather than as a grant of judicial power: the judicial power extends, but 
extends only, to the matters described in section 2.  Alternatively, if the jurisdictional 
grants in section 2 describe the minimum but not the maximum jurisdiction of the federal 
courts, the section 2 enumerations would serve as clarifications of the scope of the 
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judicial power (and perhaps as limitations on Congress’s authority to control that 
jurisdiction).79 
The contrast between Article I and Article III is striking.  Article I begins with a 
vesting clause that refers to otherwise-granted powers but does not itself grant powers.  
The article then continues with a series of provisions specifying that “Congress shall have 
Power” to perform a variety of activities; those provisions (in conjunction with others 
scattered throughout Articles I-V) clearly define the scope of Congress’s power.  The 
specific enumerations of congressional power are unambiguously grants of power.  
Article III, by contrast, begins with a grant of the “judicial Power,” which confers on the 
federal courts all powers that fall within that general classification.  The article then 
continues with limitations and qualifications on that power.  The specific “enumerations” 
in Article III – the heads of jurisdiction in Article III, section 2 – are not grants of power.  
Together, Articles I and III thus present two different models for giving effect to specific 
enumerations in the Constitution: the enumerations can serve as grants of power (Article 
I) or as limitations on grants of power (Article III). 
 Into which pattern does Article II best fit? 
 
  2.  Of Cabbages and Kings:  Vesting Executive Power 
 
                                                 
79   It is something of an understatement to describe as “settled law” the proposition that section 2 
enumerates the full scope of federal court jurisdiction.  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 
176 (1803).  As a matter of pure textual exegesis, however, that conclusion is not inevitable.  We do not 
opine here on Marbury’s correctness as a matter of original meaning.  For our purposes, nothing turns on 
whether the enumerations in Article III, section 2 are exhaustive (and therefore limitations on the judicial 
power) or nonexhaustive (and therefore clarifications of the judicial power).  In neither case does section 2 
function as a grant of power. 
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On the one hand, Article II, as does Article III, begins with an unqualified vesting 
clause: “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of 
America.”  The Article II Vesting Clause does not refer to executive powers “herein 
granted,” but seems to follow the Article III formula of granting a general power that 
includes, at least as a prima facie matter, whatever powers a fully-informed late 
eighteenth-century audience would have understood “executive Power” to include. 
On the other hand, sections 2 and 3 of Article II are full of provisions which state 
that the President “shall have Power” to perform certain acts.  In that respect, sections 2 
and 3 seem to resemble Article I, section 8, which grants various powers to Congress.  
The “shall have Power” provisions of Article II point towards the view that presidential 
power stems from specific enumerations rather than from a general vesting clause.  If that 
is true, then the Article II Vesting Clause, as with the Article I Vesting Clause, might best 
be understood as a designation of office rather than as a grant of power.  The Treaty 
Clause, as one of the enumerated powers in Article II, section 2, would then best be 
understood as a grant of power to both the President and the Senate. 
 Article II does not precisely follow the form of either Article I or Article III,80 but 
on balance the evidence strongly supports the view that the President’s power stems from 
the Article II Vesting Clause, with sections 2 and 3 of Article II serving to limit, clarify, 
and qualify that basic power grant.  This position does not reflect current law or the 
weight of scholarly opinion, but it does best reflect the Constitution’s original meaning. 
                                                 
80   For an elegant and enlightening discussion of the distinctive features of each of the first three articles, 
see Douglas G. Smith, Separation of Powers and the Constitutional Text, 28 N. Ky. L. Rev. 595 (2001) 
(detailing the many ways in which the Constitution mixes powers in a way that pure theory would not). 
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 Put simply: All of the considerations that support reading the Article III Vesting 
Clause as a grant of power81 also support a similar reading of the Article II Vesting 
Clause. The language of the clause reads as a grant of “executive Power”; dictionary 
understandings of the word “vest” reinforce this meaning; other uses of the word “vest” 
in the Constitution consistently support a power-granting understanding of the term; and 
the parallel formulation in the Article III Vesting Clause further supports the power-grant 
reading of the Article II Vesting Clause.  There is no “herein granted” language in the 
Article II Vesting Clause that might direct one away from this reading.  The prima facie 
case for construing the Article II Vesting Clause as a grant of power is quite compelling. 
 Large segments of the legal community disagree.  Modern doctrine is in many 
crucial respects inconsistent with the view that the Article II Vesting Clause is a grant of 
power,82 and a wide range of scholars expressly reject the power-grant reading of the 
Article II Vesting Clause.83  Those rejections, however, are often noticeably short on 
arguments that are relevant for reasonable-observer originalists.84  We are aware of only 
                                                 
81   See supra XX. 
 
82   For a compendium of inconsistencies between the power-grant reading of Article II (and Article III) and 
modern law, see Joseph P. Verdon, Note, The Vesting Clauses, The Nixon Test, and the Pharoah’s Dreams, 
78 Va. L. Rev. 1253 (1992). 
 
83   See, e.g., Flaherty, supra note XX, at 1778; Froomkin, The Imperial President’s New Vestments, supra 
note XX, at 1363; Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 
Am. U.L. Rev. 443, 466 (1987); Morton Rosenberg, Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking: An 
Analysis of Constitutional Issues That May Be Raised by Executive Order 12,291, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 1199, 
1209 (1981). 
  
84   That is not surprising, as few academicians (or judges) are reasonable-observer originalists.  But to the 
extent that such scholars are trying to tackle the power-grant reading of the Article II Vesting Clause on the 
terms of its proponents, who do tend to be reasonable-observer originalists, the form of the argument 
becomes very important. 
     Professor Froomkin, we suspect, will be surprised to find his extensive discussions of the Article II 
Vesting Clause relegated to a footnote.  But Professor Froomkin concentrates almost all of his fire on the 
analogy between the Article II and Article III Vesting Clauses.  We make less of that analogy than did 
Professor Calabresi and Kevin Rhodes, to whom Professor Froomkin was directly responding.  Professor 
Froomkin has relatively little to say about the direct textual arguments that actually formed the foundation 
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two comprehensive critiques of the Vesting Clause thesis (as modern scholars generally 
call the view that the Article II and Article III Vesting Clauses grant power), and neither 
is persuasive. 
 
a.  Defending Executive Vestments I (or The President, The 
Administration, And The Wardrobe) 
 
An important set of criticisms of the Vesting Clause thesis has come from 
Professors Larry Lessig and Cass Sunstein, who defend at some length the claim that the 
Article II Vesting Clause “says who has the executive power, not what that power is, just 
as the Vesting Clause of Article I says who has the legislative power (a Congress), while 
section 8 says what that power is, and the Vesting Clause of Article III says who has the 
judicial power (one Supreme Court at least) while section 2 specifies to what that power 
‘extends.’ ”85  Professors Lessig and Sunstein offer four distinct arguments against the 
Vesting Clause thesis.  All four lead nowhere. 
 The first argument is best labelled “the argument from redundancy”: if the 
Vesting Clause grants power, “it would have the effect of rendering superfluous much of 
the balance of Article II, since much of the balance of Article II merely articulates what 
. . . [the Vesting Clause thesis] would say is implied in the Vesting Clause.”86  The 
argument fails for three reasons. 
First, as Professors Calabresi and Prakash point out, an interpretation of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
of the Calabresi/Rhodes, Calabresi, and Calabresi/Prakash positions and that form the foundation of our 
construction of the vesting clauses here. 
  
85   Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 48 
(1994). 
 
86   Id. at 49. 
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Article II Vesting Clause as a designation of office is even more flagrantly redundant 
than is the Vesting Clause thesis; provisions of the Constitution other than the Article II 
Vesting Clause consistently refer to a single Chief Executive known as the President, 
which renders the Lessig/Sunstein construction of Article II utterly purposeless.87  
Second, as Professors Calabresi and Prakash have also responded, it is easy to overstate 
the weight of arguments from redundancy in constitutional interpretation.88  That is 
especially true when one is discussing redundancy among clauses rather than redundancy 
among terms within a clause; arguments from redundancy are much more plausible in the 
latter cases.89  Third, Calabresi and Rhodes, echoed by Calabresi and Prakash, try to 
explain how at least some of the specific provisions in sections 2 and 3 of Article II do 
not simply replicate the “executive Power” granted by the Article II Vesting Clause but 
instead limit that executive power in various ways.90  We take that argument one large 
step further: we maintain that none of the apparent enumerations of presidential power in 
sections 2 and 3 of Article II in fact grant any powers that the President does not 
otherwise possess.  Instead, they serve to limit, clarify, or qualify the President’s 
“executive Power” in order to avoid misconstruction of that power, Congress’s 
constitutional powers, or both.  Thus, although a number of those provisions are phrased 
as grants of power to the President, that is not in fact their constitutional function or 
meaning. 
                                                 
87   See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note XX, at 576-77. 
 
88   See id. at 577; Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note XX, at 1196 n.216. 
  
89   See Lawson, supra note XX, at 1719-21 (discussing the differences between redundancy within clauses 
and redundancy among clauses). 
 
90   See id. at 577-79. 
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A prime example is the first sentence of Article II, section 2: “The President shall 
be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of 
the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.”91  If the 
Article II Vesting Clause grants something called “executive Power” to the President, it 
surely grants to the President power to command American military forces as an element 
of that “executive Power.”  Commanding military forces goes to the very heart of what 
chief executives traditionally do.  So why would the Constitution then additionally 
specify that power if, as we claim, it had already been granted by the Vesting Clause? 
The answer is that the Article II (and Article III) strategy of granting a general 
power (the “executive Power” or the “judicial Power”) poses dangers of congressional 
encroachment on those powers.  When powers are not precisely specified, one can expect 
the legislative department’s “impetuous vortex”92 to make overreaching efforts to claim 
them.  This is an especially great danger with respect to the crucial power to direct troop 
movements.  The Constitution vests considerable power over the military in Congress.  
Article I expressly gives to Congress the Power “[t]o declare War, grant Letters of 
Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water,”93 “[t]o 
raise and support Armies,”94 “[t]o provide and maintain a Navy,”95 “[t]o make Rules for 
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,”96 “[t]o provide for calling 
                                                 
91   U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 
92   The Federalist No. 48, at 309 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (James Madison). 
 
93   U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 
94   Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
 
95   Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 13. 
 
96   Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
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forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel 
Invasions,”97 and “[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and 
for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United 
States.”98  Absent these specific provisions allocating power to Congress, at least some of 
these powers arguably might have belonged to the President pursuant to the grant of the 
“executive Power.”99  The Constitution clearly takes great pains to make clear that 
Congress is an important player in the control of the military.  The power to direct troop 
movements, of course, is not among the enumerated military powers of Congress.  But it 
is not difficult to imagine Congress arguing that its impressive enumerated military 
powers somehow imply that it also has the power to control the actual operations of the 
armed forces.  Alternatively, one can imagine Congress claiming that its power to “make 
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” its otherwise-
enumerated congressional powers over the military includes the power of troop direction.  
Neither argument is persuasive on its own terms, but it is entirely predictable that 
Congress would make such arguments if the Constitution did not prevent it.  And if 
Congress made those arguments, in the absence of a Commander-in-Chief Clause to 
render them frivolous, the country could be plunged into a constitutional confrontation 
during times of national crisis.  Thus, the Commander-in-Chief Clause functions as an 
anti-inference device: it makes absolutely clear that the President’s “executive Power,” 
not Congress’s enumerated military powers, contains the power to direct the American 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
97   Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. 
 
98   Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. 
 
99   See Smith, supra note XX, at 601-02. 
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military.  The Commander-in-Chief Clause thus clarifies presidential power in a crucial 
area and thereby avoids needless but otherwise likely constitutional conflict. 
Similar considerations account for the Opinions Clause, which immediately 
follows the Commander-in-Chief Clause in Article II, section 2.  That clause states that 
the President “may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the 
executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective 
Offices.”  This clause has greatly puzzled constitutional scholars.  Why give the President 
such a strange power?  Doesn’t this clause prove that the President has no general power 
to direct the activities of subordinates?  And more to the point, doesn’t it prove that the 
Article II Vesting Clause could not possibly be a grant of power, because any such grant 
of “executive Power” would surely include something as basic as the power to ask 
subordinates for written opinions? 
Again, however, the Opinions Clause forecloses a predictable, and predictably 
damaging, inference that Congress might otherwise seek to draw.  All executive offices 
except the presidency and the vice presidency are created by statute pursuant to the 
Sweeping Clause; the Constitution does not of its own force create any federal agencies 
or executive officers.  Statutes determine the titles of executive offices, the powers of 
executive offices, the salaries of executive offices, and all other properties of executive 
offices.100  It is easy to envision Congress specifying that certain executive officials – 
such as the Secretary of War or the Secretary of State – must report directly to Congress 
and may not report to the President.  Perhaps such a statute would not be “necessary and 
                                                 
100   Does that mean that Congress can also determine the tenure of executive offices and thus constrain the 
President’s ability to remove executive officials.  Our answer -- somewhat heretically for advocates of a 
unitary executive – is “quite possibly yes.”  See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative 
State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231, 1243-45 (1994). 
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proper” under the Sweeping Clause in the absence of the Opinions Clause, but this would 
be a very large, and potentially explosive, question to leave to inference.  It is entirely 
sensible for a constitution to foreclose that argument by making clear that the President 
cannot be cut off from communicating with subordinates.  The Opinions Clause, as does 
the Commander-in-Chief-Clause, thus serves as an anti-inference provision that clarifies 
presidential power that is otherwise granted by the Article II Vesting Clause.101 
The same can be said of the Pardons Clause, which states that the President “shall 
have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except 
in Cases of Impeachment.”  Surely the “executive Power” includes the pardon power; 
that was a traditional aspect of the power of chief executives.  But because Congress 
defines all federal criminal offenses, there is value in preventing Congress from trying to 
use the Sweeping Clause to place certain offenses beyond the pardon power.  That is a 
particular danger with respect to treason, because the Constitution specifically declares 
that “Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason.”102  In the 
absence of the Pardons Clause, could Congress reason that in order to protect its power to 
define the punishment for treason, the President must not be allowed to interfere with the 
administration of that punishment through pardons?  Any such statute would likely be 
unconstitutional even without the Pardons Clause, but again why leave to inference the 
resolution of a conflict that is likely to arise in the most heated of settings? 
The Pardons Clause also specifies that the President’s pardon power does not 
extend to “Cases of Impeachment.”  That provision was, strictly speaking, unnecessary, 
                                                 
101   See Prakash, supra note XX, at 729-30 (advancing this interpretations of the Opinions Clause – among 
several others – and attributing it to Professor Michael Rappaport). 
 
102   U.S. Const. art. III, § 3, cl. 2. 
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because impeachment is not a criminal proceeding and therefore could never come within 
the pardon power encompassed by the grant of the “executive Power” in the Article II 
Vesting Clause.  Nonetheless, just as one can readily imagine circumstances in which the 
risk of congressional overreaching is high, one can also readily imagine circumstances in 
which presidents might be inclined to stretch their powers beyond the breaking point.  
Wouldn’t it be tempting for presidents to try to argue that impeachments are analogous 
enough to criminal proceedings to come within the pardon power?  Why not forestall that 
predictable inference, and thus avoid serious constitutional conflict at a time of crisis, by 
telling the President up front to back off?  The “limitation” on the President’s pardon 
power contained in the Pardons Clause is thus not a “limitation” at all, in the sense that it 
does not alter the legal world; the President’s pardon power would not extend to 
impeachment even if the Pardons Clause contained no such express provision.  Rather, 
the provision serves an anti-inference function by clarifying an already-existing 
limitation on the scope of presidential power. 
All three provisions in Article II, section 2, clause 1 thus function as anti-
inference provisions that clarify rather than grant (or limit) presidential powers.  They do 
not expand (or contract) the President’s executive power, but rather warn Congress (or 
the President) against attempting to encroach (or enlarge) upon that power in predictabe 
ways and thus avoid constitutional conflicts on matters of urgent national interest which 
are likely to present the highest political stakes. 
Article II, section 2, clause 2 contains, in addition to the Treaty Clause, the 
Appointments Clause, which provides that the President “shall nominate, and by and with 
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers 
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and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, 
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be 
established by Law; but the Congress may be Law vest the Appointment of such inferior 
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the 
Heads of Departments.”103  The appointment power certainly seems like an aspect of the 
“executive Power” that the President would gain from the Article II Vesting Clause if that 
clause is indeed a grant of power, at least in the absence of constitutional specification to 
the contrary.104  The Appointments Clause, however, significantly limits and qualifies the 
President’s appointment power.  The Congress is granted a crucial role in determining 
which inferior officers can be appointed by persons other than the President; the heads of 
executive departments and the federal courts are granted power to make certain 
appointments if Congress so specifies; and the Senate is granted a crucial role in the 
appointment process for principal officers and for all inferior officers whose mode of 
appointment does not specifically exclude the Senate.  Thus, the Appointments Clause 
functions as a grant of power to Congress, the Senate, executive department heads, and 
the federal courts.  It is a limitation on presidential power in the form of a grant of power 
to other actors.105  It is not a grant of power to the President. 
The Recess Appointment Clause, which says that the President “shall have Power 
to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting 
                                                 
103   U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 
104   Founding-era state constitutions often specified to the contrary.  See Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. 
Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 545, 578 (2004). 
   
105   See Smith, supra note XX, at 597. 
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Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session,”106 is necessitated by 
the grant of appointment power to the Senate in the Appointments Clause.  Some 
provision had to be made for appointments when the Senate was not available to 
complete them.  The Recess Appointments Clause thus serves essentially as a limitation 
on presidential appointment power during periods of senatorial recess. 
Section 3 of Article II contains a series of provisions concerning presidential 
power, many of which are phrased as duties rather than powers.  The President “shall 
from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and 
recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and 
expedient.”107  These are obligations imposed upon the President rather than powers 
granted to him and thus cannot even in principle implicate the status of the Article II 
Vesting Clause as a grant of power. 
The next provision of section 3 is phrased as a grant of power: “he may, on 
extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of 
Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn 
them to such Time as he shall think proper.”108  This provision, however, functions as a 
limitation on presidential power.  A bare grant of the “executive Power” would at least 
arguably grant the President broad power to adjourn the legislature109; this clause 
confines that power to a narrowly defined scope. 
                                                 
106   U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
 
107   Id. art. II, § 3. 
 
108   Id. 
 
109   See Smith, supra note XX, at 608-09. 
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The final three provisions of Article II, section 3 are formulated a bit more 
ambiguously than some of the others: “he shall receive Ambassadors and other public 
Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission 
all the Officers of the United States.”110  Although the word “shall” can sometimes 
signify a grant of power, the context of at least the last two of these provisions suggests 
the imposition of duties more naturally than it does the grant of powers.  That is clearest 
in the case of the Take Care Clause.  English monarchs had occasionally claimed the 
power to suspend laws by refusing to enforce them.  It thus makes very good sense for a 
presidential power of law execution granted by the Vesting Clause to be cabined by the 
Take Care Clause – the President does not have absolute discretion with respect to law 
execution but must exercise that power faithfully.  The Take Care Clause thus neatly 
eliminates any possible presidential claim to a royal power of suspension.111  The 
Commissions Clause similarly reads most naturally as a duty – as a certain Secretary of 
State and would-be Justice of the Peace once taught us. 
The Receipt of Ambassadors Clause, however, simply does not make sense as a 
duty.  To say that the President “shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers” 
leaves open a great many questions: Exactly who counts as a legitimate foreign emissary?  
On what terms will such emissaries be received?  Which functionaries are appropriate 
stand-ins for the President?  The clause makes sense only if it reads as though the 
President “shall [be the person who bears responsibility to] receive Ambassadors and 
other public Ministers.”  As with the provisions in Article II, section 2, this clause thus 
                                                 
110   U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. 
 
111   See Lawson & Moore, supra note XX, at 1312-13; Prakash, supra note XX, at 722-26. 
 
 51
avoids potential conflict with Congress over who bears primary diplomatic responsibility.  
The “executive Power” is a natural home for both the ceremonial and substantive 
functions involved in receiving foreign emissaries, but one can imagine Congress 
claiming the right to, for example, determine who to recognize as a legitimate foreign 
emissary as an incident to its powers to regulate foreign commerce or declare war.  
Dispute about such matters could prove eminently embarrassing, so it is eminently 
sensible to foreclose the prospect of conflict. 
It is thus possible to integrate all of the provisions of Article II into a unified 
theory of Article II that is anchored by the Vesting Clause thesis.  To anticipate an 
obvious objection to the foregoing account: no, we do not maintain that the available 
historical records show clear expressions of intent on the part of the framers to construct 
Article II as we have presented it.  There is nothing in the drafting history of the 
Constitution that points inexorably (or even feebly) towards all of the constructions that 
we have placed upon the various provisions concerning the President.  We have instead 
produced an idealized reconstruction of Article II that harmonizes the provisions with 
certain fundamental principles derived from the Constitution’s overall text and structure, 
most notably the Vesting Clause thesis which is compelled, at least as a prima facie 
matter, by the textual, intratextual, and structural features of the Constitution’s use of the 
terms “vest” and “vested.”  That is, we submit, exactly the right way to discern the 
meaning of Article II.  After all, we are not arguing that the text and structure of sections 
2 and 3 of Article II affirmatively mandate the Vesting Clause thesis; we are arguing 
merely that those provisions do not provide a compelling reason to abandon the Vesting  
Clause thesis that is derived from other considerations.  Understood from the perspective 
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of an ideal observer who has already acknowledged the potent prima facie case for the 
Vesting Clause thesis, the provisions in sections 2 and 3 of Article II other than the 
Treaty Clause appear most plausibly as duties imposed on the President, clarifications of 
presidential power that forestall constitutional conflicts, or qualifications or limitations on 
presidential power.  Some of these provisions grant power to non-presidential actors, but 
none grant power to the President.  Nothing in sections 2 and 3 of Article II casts doubt 
on the status of the Article II Vesting Clause as a grant of the “executive Power” to the 
President.112  Accordingly, even if one was inclined to question the Vesting Clause thesis 
if it generated extreme redundancy, the structure of Article II does not exhibit such 
redundancy. 
The second argument against the Vesting Clause thesis advanced by Professors 
Lessig and Sunstein can be labelled “the argument from the Hamilton that didn’t bark in 
the night.”  In a series of essays in The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton discussed the 
constitutional powers of the President.113  He never mentioned the Article II Vesting 
Clause among those powers.  Thus, “not even Hamilton described the Vesting Clause as 
an independent source of substantive executive power, though he was in general quite 
eager to define a strong executive.  In his catalog of the executive powers, contrasting the 
American executive with the British monarch, nowhere does he discuss a general 
executive power arising from the Vesting Clause.”114  If even someone as disposed 
                                                 
112    The President does in fact draw power from constitutional provisions other than the Vesting Clause, 
but those provisions are not found in Article II.  See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cls. 2-3 (describing the 
President’s role in the lawmaking process). 
 
113   The Federalist Nos. 69, 73-77, supra note XX, at 417-23, 442-63. 
 
114   Lessig & Sunstein, supra note XX, at 49.  See also Bradley & Flaherty, supra note XX, at 602 (making 
a similar argument). 
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towards broad executive power as Alexander Hamilton did not recognize the Article II 
Vesting Clause as a power grant, how are we to do so? 
 Professors Calabresi and Prakash have responded that Hamilton, whatever his 
personal beliefs may have been, was unlikely to trumpet a broad presidential power in a 
document that was designed to defuse Antifederalist criticism of the Constitution.115  
They are exactly right.  The Federalist was campaign literature, and it needs to be viewed 
as such.  Unlike modern campaign literature, it occasionally contains some very profound 
observations about human nature, governmental structure, and the workings of the 
Constitution, but one must tread carefully when using it as an interpretative guide. 
Third, Professors Lessig and Sunstein make what we somewhat teasingly call “the 
argument from Illinois.”  They claim that “while the federal constitution certainly 
constituted a more unitary executive than most state constitutions, the same language 
vesting executive power in state constitutions had been understood at the time of the 
framing not to mark an inherent power, but to describe an authority limited to that power 
enumerated.  At least as a presumption, similar language in the federal constitution would 
suggest a similar understanding.”116  So phrased, this looks like a very sensible argument.  
If founding-era state constitutions actually used executive vesting clauses as designations 
of office rather than as grants of power, that would be relevant evidence concerning the 
meaning of the Article II Vesting Clause. 
                                                 
115   Calabresi & Prakash, supra note XX, at 612. 
 
116   Lessig & Sunstein, supra note XX, at 49-50. 
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Unfortunately for Professors Lessig and Sunstein, the only example of such a 
constitution that they can muster comes from an 1839 Illinois Supreme Court decision117 
construing the executive vesting clause of the 1818 Illinois constitution.118  That case did 
indeed hold that the Illinois constitution’s executive vesting clause did not grant any 
power to the Illinois governor, and in particular did not grant the power to remove at will 
the Illinois Secretary of State.  But 1839 is, by our count, fifty-one years after the 
ratification of the federal Constitution.119  As evidence of the original meaning of the 
Federal Constitution of 1788, this leaves something to be desired.120 
More to the point, a broader study of state constitutions that really were from the 
founding era provides support for the Vesting Clause thesis.  Such a study of state 
constitutions from 1776-77 has been conducted by Lance Miller,121 and it discloses that 
the text and structure of these constitutions, as well as the practices of state governments 
under them, tends to support the view that founding-era executive vesting clauses were, 
at least some of time, grants of executive power.  For instance, some of those early 
constitutions, after describing specific powers of the chief executive, have vesting clauses 
that refer to “all other executive powers” or “all the other executive powers of 
                                                 
117   See Field v. People ex rel. McClernand, 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) 79 (1839). 
 
118   See Ill. Const. of 1818 art. 3, § 1 (“The executive power of the state shall be vested in a governor.”). 
 
119   At least part of the Constitution became effective in 1788.  Other parts did not become fully effective 
until 1789.  See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, 77 Notre Dame 
L. Rev. 1 (2001). 
 
120   See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note XX, at 613. 
 
121   See Lance E. Miller, Power of the Federal Presidency: Perspectives From Early State Constitutions 
(manuscript of March 29, 2004 on file with authors).  In the interests of full disclosure: Mr. Miller wrote 
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government.”122   As Mr. Miller ably concludes, “[b]y vesting ‘all other’ executive 
powers in the executive, the framers of these early constitutions indicated an 
understanding that the listed powers granted [to] the governors are part of a larger class 
of ‘executive powers.’ ”123  These early constitutions are thus precedents for grants of 
general executive powers to chief magistrates.  Moreover, various executives under these 
first constitutions “acted to seize property, change a state capital, and authorize payments, 
all under authority not specifically iterated under their respective constitutions.”124  These 
actions, which were not challenged on constitutional grounds, make sense only if the 
relevant vesting clauses granted these governors a general executive power.  The overall 
lesson to be drawn from Mr. Miller’s study is that “while the early framers were 
protective against executive tyranny, the safeguards they instituted in their constitutions 
did not come in the form of a refusal to vest executive powers.”125  Instead, they 
employed plural executives and elaborately specified restrictions on the exercise of 
executive power.  There is, of course, some distance between state constitutions of 1776-
77 and the federal Constitution of 1788-89, but the distance is far less than the gap 
between the federal Constitution and an 1839 Illinois Supreme Court decision.  
                                                 
122   See Del. Const. of 1776, art. VII (stating that the President has power to grant pardons, lay embargoes, 
and withdraw money, and shall exercise “all other executive powers of government limited and restrained 
. . . according to the laws of the state”); Md. Const. of 1776 art. XXXIII (providing that the state’s plural 
executive has various military powers “and may alone exercise all the other executive powers of 
government”); N.C. Const. of 1776 art. XIX (providing that the state’s plural executive, in addition to 
enumerated powers, “may exercise all the other executive powers of government”). 
 
123   Miller, supra note XX, at 18. 
 
124   Id. at 34-35. 
 
125   Id. at 24-25. 
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Professors Lessig and Sunstein had the right idea, but they looked at the wrong evidence 
and reached the wrong conclusion.126   
The final argument from Professors Lessig and Sunstein can be called the “do-
you-really-want-to-go-there? argument.”  Drawing on the parallels often drawn by 
advocates of the Vesting Clause thesis between the Article II and Article III Vesting 
Clauses, Professors Lessig and Sunstein ask: “If the difference between Article II and 
Article I entails broad inherent power in the President, does it entail the same broad grant 
of inherent power in Article III?  For just like Article II, and unlike Article I, Article III 
vests ‘[t]he judicial power’ (and not just the judicial power ‘herein granted’) in ‘the 
Supreme Court.’  But does this mean that the judicial branch has a wide range of inherent 
and (legislatively) unregulable judicial authority beyond that enumerated and granted by 
Congress, drawn from English practice?”127  The subtext of this passage is fairly clear.  
Advocates of the Vesting Clause thesis tend, on the whole, to favor what one might 
loosely call “judicial restraint,” though that term is notoriously difficult to pin down.128  
                                                 
126  Professors Bradley and Flaherty appear to draw somewhat different conclusions than did Mr. Miller 
from these early state constitutions.  See Bradley & Flaherty, supra note XX, at 571-85.  But while they 
very successfully show that early state constitutions were generally distrustful of executive authority, they 
are much less successful in showing that executive vesting clauses in those constitutions were designations 
of office rather than grants of (perhaps minimal) executive authority.  At times, they seem to assume that 
vesting clauses followed by specific identifications of power cannot be grants of power and thus defeat the 
Vesting Clause thesis, see id. at 579-80, but that is simply a strong form of an unpersuasive argument from 
redundancy.  At other times, they appear to acknowledge that early vesting clauses indeed granted power, 
albeit power that was strictly limited and cabined.  See id. at 579-80 (“to the extent these general executive 
power provisions conveyed anything, they conveyed no more than a general power of implementing and 
enforcing the laws.”); id. at 580 (“General language was used to delegate only the power to implement the 
laws”).  If such clauses conveyed any power at all, they provide general support for the Vesting Clause 
thesis as we present it.  This discussion exemplifies the tendency of Professors Bradley and Flaherty to 
equivocate between different meanings of the term “Vesting Clause thesis.”  See infra XX.  And at no time 
do Professors Bradley and Flaherty consider the actual exercises of power undertaken by early state 
governors. 
   
127   Lessig & Sunstein, supra note XX, at 50. 
 
128   For a brief overview of the confusion, see Gary Lawson, Conservative or Constitutionalist?, 1 Geo. 
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 81 (2002). 
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But if the Article III Vesting Clause is, as proponents of the Vesting Clause thesis claim, 
an independent grant of power to the federal courts, what might those powers be?  
Couldn’t they include many things that make advocates of the Vesting Clause thesis 
recoil in horror?  Does the quest for the Unitary Executive lead instead to the Imperial 
Judiciary? 
The answer is that the Vesting Clause thesis does indeed mean that the 
Constitution grants to the federal judiciary “a wide range of inherent and (legislatively) 
unregulable judicial authority beyond that enumerated and granted by Congress.”  Put 
simply, the Constitution gives the federal courts power to decide cases in accordance with 
governing law.  The courts do not get that power of decisionmaking from Congress.  One 
of us has described at considerable length how far (at least he believes that) this 
unregulable judicial authority goes.129  It includes (or so Professor Lawson believes), for 
example, power to fashion rules of evidence and other principles of decisionmaking free 
from legislative control.  But that power is not unlimited.  It extends only to those matters 
which concern the decisionmaking process of the federal judiciary.  That is not a trivial 
set of concerns, but it does not make the federal courts all-powerful.  The grant of power 
in Article III, after all, is a grant of “judicial Power,” not a grant of all possible power.  
The general nature of the grant does not make it an unlimited grant.  In other words, if 
Professors Lessig and Sunstein want to try to discredit the Vesting Clause thesis with 
claims about its implications for the power of the federal courts, we say: “Bring it on!” 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
129   See Lawson, supra note XX.  And yes, many advocates of the Vesting Clause thesis will recoil in 
horror from these conclusions. 
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b.  Defending Executive Vestments II (or Executive Power 
Existentialism and Foreign Affairs) 
 
Professors Curtis Bradley and Martin Flaherty have recently entered the debate 
with a lengthy attack on the Vesting Clause thesis.130  Their argument is difficult to 
summarize for two reasons.  First, it spans 144 law review pages.  Second, and more 
importantly, it is not clear precisely what version of the Vesting Clause thesis Professors 
Bradley and Flaherty mean to attack.  Their argument was prompted by the argument of 
Professors Sai Prakash and Michael Ramsey that the Article II Vesting Clause grants to 
the President a specific package of powers over foreign affairs that includes such things 
as the power to recall ambassadors, to communicate with foreign governments, and to 
terminate treaties.131  The Prakash/Ramsey position entails two distinct claims: that the 
Article II Vesting Clause grants to the President a set of powers called the “executive 
Power,” and that such powers include certain specific foreign affairs powers.  If the first 
claim is false, the second is false as well, but the first claim can be true even if the second 
is false.  The content of the “executive Power” granted to the President by the Vesting 
Clause is an issue separate from whether the Article II Vesting Clause grants power.  It is 
frequently unclear to which of these claims Professors Bradley and Flaherty are trying to 
respond, but it seems as though they are primarily concerned with the more specific claim 
that the Vesting Clause grants certain foreign affairs powers.  Indeed, some of their most 
powerful arguments involve pointing out that evidenced mustered by Professors Prakash 
and Ramsey supports only the general proposition that the Article II Vesting Clause 
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131   See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 
Yale L.J. 231 (2000). 
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grants some power, such as a power to execute the laws, but not more precise 
propositions about foreign affairs powers.132 
But while the vast bulk of their argument clearly targets something that is best 
labeled the “Foreign Affairs Vesting thesis” rather than the “Vesting Clause thesis,” 
Professors Bradley and Flaherty do put forward a case against the more general Vesting 
Clause thesis that we advance here.  We are unmoved. 
Many parts of the Bradley/Flaherty critique of the Vesting Clause thesis are 
familiar.  They suggest, as have others before them, that the use of the “herein granted” 
language in the Article I Vesting Clause but not in the Article II or Article III Vesting 
Clauses may have been the product of a drafting accident rather than conscious design.133  
That may be true, but it does not affect the meaning of the Constitution from the 
perspective of reasonable-observer originalism, which is concerned with how the 
Constitution’s language would be publicly perceived by a reaonable observer rather than 
with the motivations behind that language.  Moreover, it misunderstands the role of the 
“herein granted” language, which is hardly “the principal textual argument”134 in support 
of the Vesting Clause thesis.  The principal textual argument is the text of the Article II 
and Article III Vesting Clauses and the other constitutional provisions that use the words 
“vest” and “vested,” which seem on their faces to be grants of power.  The “herein 
granted” language in Article I highlights the fact that the Article II and Article III Vesting 
Clauses do not expressly direct one outside those clauses for definitions of the powers of 
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133   See id. at 553-54 (citing David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period, 
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the President and the federal courts, but that language does not anchor the argument for 
the Vesting Clause thesis. 
Professors Bradley and Flaherty also advance at some length the argument from 
redundancy, emphasizing that past defenders of the Vesting Clause thesis have not 
provided convincing explanations for all of the specific enumerations in sections 2 and 3 
of Article II.135  We have addressed that argument at length already.136  They further 
suggest that general grants of executive (and, one presumes, judicial) authority, such as 
those claimed by the Vesting Clause thesis, are “at least in tension with the enumerated 
powers structure of the Constitution,”137 but power-granting vesting clauses in fact 
enumerate powers.  There may be a good case against construing those general powers 
broadly, but not against construing them as powers.  And Professors Bradley and 
Flaherty also offer a (somewhat meandering) argument based on the comparison between 
Article II and Article III, which eventually culminates in a claim about the scope of the 
power granted by the Article II Vesting Clause rather than a claim about the Vesting 
Clause thesis in its most general form.138 
Overhanging the entire Bradley/Flaherty argument are two methodological 
puzzles.  Professors Bradley and Flaherty do not claim decisively to have defeated the 
Vesting Clause thesis on the basis of text and structure.  Rather, they advance their 
textual and structural arguments in order to show that the “textual arguments in support 
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of the Vesting Clause Thesis are, at best, indeterminate,”139 and that “the legitimacy of 
the Vesting Clause Thesis cannot be determined simply by looking at what the 
Constitution says.”140  The first puzzle is figuring out what they mean by 
“indeterminate.”  If they mean that the Vesting Clause thesis cannot be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, they have a point – albeit a point that renders “indeterminate” virtually 
every interesting question in constitutional law from the perspective of virtually every 
interpretative approach that one can imagine.  If instead they mean that one cannot, using 
arguments from text and structure, evaluate the relative plausibility of the Vesting Clause 
thesis compared to other interpretations of the vesting clauses, they are just wrong. 
This leads to the second methodological puzzle.  Professors Bradley and Flaherty 
are very quick to give up on textual and structural arguments and  pronounce them 
indeterminate.  It sometimes seems as though they regard the conceivability of alternative 
interpretations as grounds for existentialist-like despair about the utility of textual and 
structural reasoning.  This contrasts sharply with their sophisticated, detailed, and 
painstaking parsing of historical materials, which displays a keen sensitivity to sometimes 
subtle differences in interpretations of such materials.  In our view, the expenditure of 
energy should be allocated in precisely the opposite fashion.  One should direct primary 
attention to sophisticated, detailed, and painstaking scrutiny of textual and structural 
arguments and turn to history only as a last resort.  With the expenditure of some energy, 
the textual and structural arguments in favor of the Vesting Clause thesis emerge as 
considerably stronger than Professors Bradley and Flaherty seem willing to credit – and 
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certainly as stronger than any alternative construction of the Vesting Clauses.  That is 
enough to let argument go forward.  
 
   c.  Tailoring Executive Vestments 
   
In the end, the case for a power-grant reading of the Article II Vesting Clause is 
very strong.  The primary question raised by the Article II Vesting Clause is not whether 
it grants power to the President but rather what kind of power it grants.  What is the scope 
of the “executive Power” that is vested in the President by Article II?  That is an 
enormous question that we cannot pursue here in depth.  For now, we must be content 
with several preliminary observations, some of which we have foreshadowed and some 
of which we will shortly elaborate. 
First, a general power is not an unlimited power.  Any power claimed by the 
President under the Article II Vesting Clause must fall within a late eighteenth-century 
understanding of “executive Power” in the aftermath of an anti-monarchical revolution.  
There are many imaginable assertions of presidential power that fail the laugh test under 
this standard, such as the power to take over steel mills,141 to halt pending judicial 
proceedings,142 and to make law under the guise of “interpretation.”143  The “executive 
Power” granted by the Vesting Clause is not the royal prerogative.  It is not necessarily a 
very large power at all. 
                                                 
141   See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).  Constitution 1, President 0. 
 
142   See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 653 (1981).  Constitution 1, President 1. 
 
143   See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).  President 2, Constitution 1. 
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Second, the term “executive Power” clearly did not have a single, well-defined, 
universally understood meaning in the founding era; that much has been more than amply 
demonstrated by Professors Bradley and Flaherty.144  That does not establish, however, 
that the term was empty or meaningless; “[a] term need not be precisely determinate in 
order to have meaningful content.”145 
Third, the core meaning of “executive Power” is the power to execute federal 
laws.146  This power is not merely the power mechanistically to follow congressional 
commands, but also includes elements of discretion in enforcement policy, interpretation 
of ambiguous statutes (up to a point), and what can best be described as the setting of 
administrative policy.147 
Fourth, and more controversially, the “executive Power” also includes foreign 
affairs powers that are not otherwise allocated to specific institutions by the Constitution.  
According to Professors Prakash and Ramsey, these powers include such things as the 
power to direct troop movements, to communicate with foreign nations, to recall 
ambassadors, to enter into executive agreements, and probably to terminate treaties.  
Professors Bradley and Flaherty, of course, vigorously contest all of these claims.  We 
are not prepared to say that Professors Prakash and Ramsey are right about every single 
power that they claim for the President under the Article II Vesting Clause.148  But we do 
                                                 
144   See Bradley & Flaherty, supra note XX; Flaherty, supra note XX. 
 
145   Lawson, supra note XX, at 338 n.43. 
 
146   See Prakash, supra note XX. 
 
147  A broad understanding of law execution could even extend to such matters as the power to pardon, to 
appoint, and perhaps to remove subordinates, though the point is incidental to the present argument. 
 
148   At least one of us is especially dubious about the validity of executive agreements. 
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believe that at least some powers that can loosely be labeled “foreign affairs powers” are 
encompassed by the Article II Vesting Clause.  At the risk of engaging a 144-page 
discussion in a few sentences: It does not suffice to say, as Professors Bradley and 
Flaherty convincingly say, that “executive Power” was a messy, contested concept in the 
late eighteenth century.  That does not foreclose a best reading of the concept in specific 
circumstances.  Nor does it suffice to say, as Professors Bradley and Flaherty 
convincingly say, that available founding-era records do not yield extensive discussions 
that specifically mention the “executive Power” in Article II as a locus of foreign affairs 
powers.  Originalist arguments that focus on public meaning, and particularly the 
reasonable-observer originalism that we employ, operate on a higher level of conceptual 
generality than Professors Bradley and Flaherty address.  And that brings us to the 
principal point: For reasonable-observer originalists, the central insight of the 
Prakash/Ramsey argument is one which Professors Bradley and Flaherty do not really 
engage149: Whatever some pure theory might or might not say about the allocation of 
foreign affairs powers, the federal Constitution, which adopts the strategy of enumerating 
the powers of federal institutions, specifically grants to Congress something less than the 
full range of traditional foreign affairs powers and then grants “executive Power” to the 
President.  Either the grant of the “executive Power” includes some of these traditional 
foreign affairs powers that are not granted to Congress (with room for argument about 
exactly which ones are included) or the Constitution fails to grant those powers to any 
                                                 
149   This is not a criticism of Professors Bradley and Flaherty; it is simply an observation.  They are not 
reasonable-observer originalists.  They were responding to an article that was not written from the 
perspective of reasonable-observer originalism (though at least some of that article is consistent with such 
an approach).  Professors Prakash and Ramsey made some strong claims about historical materials, so it is 
only reasonable for Professors Bradley and Flaherty to respond in kind.  Our concern is that their 
understandable focus on the historical claims has diverted attention from the more basic textual and 
structural claims to which historical argument is appropriately the handmaiden. 
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federal institution.  Perhaps the Constitution is a major botch-job which left many of 
those powers ungranted.  But while we are perhaps more willing than are Professors 
Prakash and Ramsey to indulge the possibility that some foreign affairs powers slipped 
through the constitutional cracks and therefore cannot be claimed by any federal 
institution, we suspect that a fully-informed reasonable observer would be loathe to reach 
that conclusion with respect to all otherwise expressly unallocated foreign affairs powers 
when a sensible alternative is at hand. 
The Article II Vesting Clause grants “executive Power” to the President.  That 
does not make the President the King.  Nor does it make the President a cipher.  The truth 
lies in between. 
 
B.  Location, Location, Location: The Article II Treaty Clause 
 
In a portion of the Constitution, such as Article I, in which the Vesting Clause 
confers no power, the specific enumerations that follow that clause clearly represent 
grants of power that define the powers “herein granted” that belong to Congress.150  
Article I enumerations are grants of power.  In portions of the Constitution such as 
Articles II and III, however, in which the first sentence confers a general power, 
subsequent enumerations serve very different functions.  They do not grant power to the 
principal subjects of their respective Articles, but instead clarify, qualify, or limit the 
                                                 
150   Several of the Article I enumerations grant powers to entities other than Congress.  Some of the 
provisions in sections 2-5 of Article I grant powers to the individual legislative branches concerning such 
matters as appointment of legislative officers, the qualifications of Members of the legislature, and 
impeachment.  See U.S. Const. art I, §2, cl 5; id. art I, § 3, cl 5-6; id. art. I, § 5, cl 1-3.   Other provisions in 
those sections grant power to non-legislative actors, such as giving the Vice President power to preside 
over the Senate and cast tie-breaking votes, id. art I, § 3, cl 4, and the Chief Justice power to preside over 
presidential impeachment trials.  Id. art I, § 3, cl 6. 
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basic power grants in the vesting clauses.  They sometimes grant power to to other actors, 
but not to the actors that receive power from the vesting clauses. 
The Treaty Clause appears in the middle of Article II, section 2.  If it follows the 
general pattern of Article II enumerations, and there is no evident reason for an observer 
to suppose that it does not, then the Treaty Clause is not a grant of power to the 
President.  It is a limitation, by way of requiring Senate consent, on a presidential power 
that is otherwise granted by the Article II Vesting Clause.  It grants power to the Senate 
that that body would not otherwise have, but it does not create a federal treaty power that 
would not exist in the clause’s absence.  Without the Treaty Clause, the President would 
have the sole power of making treaties as an aspect of the “executive Power.” 
This conclusion, while firmly grounded in constitutional structure, is not as 
straightforward as we have made it out to be.  The drafting history of the Treaty Clause 
does not reveal a conscious consensus to place the clause in the middle of Article II in 
order to cement its executive pedigree; the drafting process was considerably messier 
than that.151  Although the treaty power in the late eighteenth century, consistently with 
its Article II placement, “would historically have been understood as part of the executive 
power,”152 a number of prominent founding-era figures, including some prominent 
Framers, expressed the view that the treaty-making power was legislative, or at least was 
                                                 
151   The classic study of the drafting of the Treaty Clause, which emphasizes that the participants in the 
Constitutional Convention probably did not intend for the clause’s placement in Article II to settle this 
issue, is Jack N. Rakove, Solving a Constitutional Puzzle: The Treatymaking Clause As a Case Study, 1 
Persp. in Am. Hist. 233 (1984).  Such evidence of drafting intentions is relevant to an inquiry into original 
understanding, but is considerably less decisive to an inquiry into original meaning that focuses on the 
perceptions (whether actual or hypothetical) of the public to whom the Constitution was addressed. 
 
152   Prakash & Ramsey, supra note XX, at 292.  Indeed, virtually every important thinker who influenced 
the founding generation thought of treaty-making as an executive function.  See id. 265-72; Yoo, 
Globalism and the Constitution, supra note XX, at 1990-97. 
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not clearly executive.153  Third, as David Golove has forcefully argued,154 the eighteenth-
century historical conception of treaty making as an executive function may have rested 
on a view of executive sovereignty that does not necessarily fit the American 
Constitution very well.   Accordingly, a hypothetical, fully-informed eighteenth-century 
audience may have been quite open to the possibility that the treaty-making power under 
the American system of government is best viewed as legislative rather than executive. 
But while these considerations might be enough to establish that a treaty clause 
located among legislative powers in Article I should not be regarded as executive, it is 
very hard to see how they permit a treaty clause located in the middle of Article II to be 
viewed by an informed public as reflecting anything other than executive power.  As 
Professor John Norton Moore has elegantly put it 
It is possible to debate theoretically whether the power to make treaties is 
primarily executive or legislative, as did Hamilton and Madison in the famous 
"Pacificus-Helvidius" exchange.  Under the Constitution of the United States, 
however, there can be but one answer.  For the treaty power is placed in Article II, 
under the Executive, with a check in the Senate.  It was not placed in Article I, 
under the Legislative branch, with a check in the Executive.  The starting point for 
                                                 
153   See e.g., James Madison, Letters of Helvidius, Aug. 24, 1793, in 6 The Writings of James Madison 
138-88 (Gaillard Hunt, ed. 1906): 
 
If we consult, for a moment, the nature and operation of the two powers to declare war and to 
make treaties, it will be impossible not to see, that they can never fall within a proper definition of 
executive powers.  The natural province of the executive magistrate is to execute laws, as that of 
the legislature is to make laws.  All his acts, therefore, properly executive, must presuppose the 
existence of the laws to be executed.  A treaty is not an execution of laws; it does not presuppose 
the existence of laws.  It is, on the contrary, to have itself the force of a law, and to be carried into 
execution, like all other laws, by the executive magistrate. 
 
Other members of the founding generation expressed similar views at various times.  See Golove, supra 
note XX, at 1873-75 (noting that James Madison, George Mason, and James Wilson at the Constitutional 
Convention viewed the treaty power as legislative in character and that Alexander Hamilton took 
conflicting positions at different times).  Of course, under reasonable observer originalism, even a strong 
historical consensus in favor of an executive classification of the treaty power would not be conclusive. 
 
154   See Golove, supra note XX, at 1873-74. 
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analysis under the United States Constitution, then, is that the treaty power is 
primarily executive in its nature.155 
 
As a result of the location of the Treaty Clause, one of the “obvious” insights that 
emerges from a cursory examination of the constitutional text--that the Treaty Clause is a 
grant of power to the President and Senate--is false, at least as applied to the President.156  
Clauses that speak of granted power do not have the same meaning in Article II that they 
have in Article I.  Article II enumerations of “power” are not grants of power to the 
President that otherwise would not exist, but instead are clarifications or qualifications of 
powers that are otherwise part of the “executive Power.”  The treaty power, as befitting 
its location in the middle of Article II of the Constitution, is an aspect of the “executive 
Power,” distinguished from other aspects of the executive power by the requirement of 
consent by two thirds of the Senate. 
Accordingly, the Treaty Clause, although phrased as an enumeration of power, is 
in reality a constraint on the President’s executive power.  Alexander Hamilton thus aptly 
described the Treaty Clause when he remarked in his defense of the Neutrality 
Proclamation that “the participation of the senate in the making of Treaties and the power 
of the Legislature to declare war are exceptions out of the general ‘Executive Power’ 
vested in the President”157  To be sure, Hamilton in The Federalist, while he was trying to 
                                                 
155   John Norton Moore, Treaty Interpretation, the Constitution, and the Rule of Law, 42 Va. J. Int’l L. 
163, 192 (2001). 
 
156   The Senate does gain power from the Treaty Clause via the requirement of its “Advice and Consent” 
and two-thirds approval for the making of treaties.  Whether this power is purely a negative power of 
disapproval or a stronger power to participate in the shaping of treaties is an interesting question that we do 
not address.  For illuminating explorations, see Bradley & Flaherty, supra note XX, at 626-31; Rakove, 
supra note XX.  For whatever this may be worth to the debate: as a textual matter, it seems very difficult to 
read a provision calling for “Advice and Consent” as requiring only consent without advice. 
 
157   Pacificus No. 1, June 29, 1793, in The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 42 (Harold C. Syrett ed. 1969). 
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sell the Constitution to New Yorkers skeptical of broad presidential power, expressly 
disclaimed the executive character of the treaty power.158  As has been frequently 
observed, consistency was not always the Framers’ hallmark--which is yet another reason 
to focus on what the Constitution says rather than on what people said that is says. 
 
C.  The Limits of Executive Power: Implementation and Reasonableness 
 
The identification of the treaty power as an aspect of the “executive Power” has 
important substantive consequences.  The “executive Power” granted to the President is 
not boundless.  Nor does the dearth of express textual limitations on that power suggest a 
broad scope for presidential power.  Quite to the contrary, Article II did not need to 
enumerate the range of cases to which the “executive Power” extends in order to limit 
that power because the very nature of the executive power defines its limits. 
 
 1.  Execution as Implementation 
 
The essence of the executive power is to execute, or carry into effect, national 
laws.159  These laws include the Constitution, statutes, treaties, judicial judgments, and 
the common law of the United States to the extent that such a body of law exists, subject 
to the President’s paramount obligation to the Constitution.  But the “executive Power,” 
                                                 
158   See The Federalist No. 75, at 418 (Hamilton) (“Though several writers on the subject of government 
place that [treaty-making] power in the class of executive authorities, yet this is evidently an arbitrary 
disposition.  For if we attend carefully to its operation, it will be found to partake more of the legislative 
than of the executive character, though it does not seem strictly to fall within the definition of either of 
them.”). 
 
159   Prakash, supra note XX. 
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in the course of carrying out its essential function, can only execute laws that already 
exist independently of the exercise of federal executive power.  That execution, of course, 
can include interpretation of the laws and hence is not a purely ministerial function. It 
also includes a strong element of discretion in the selection of the means, forms, and 
priorities for execution--which collectively we might call the setting of administrative 
policy.  But all of this discretion must be exercised within the confines of ends 
established by pre-existing law.  If the laws in question leave too much to the 
imagination, their “interpretation” would in fact be the creation rather than the execution 
of the law and would therefore exceed the President’s executive power.160  Accordingly, 
the grant to the President of the “executive Power” is self-limiting.  It is a grant of power 
to carry into effect other law. 
We can now understand, intratextually, why the Article II Vesting Clause, unlike 
the Article I Sweeping Clause, does not expressly say, “The executive Power to take all 
Actions which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the Laws of the 
United States shall be vested in a President.”  The “for carrying into Execution” proviso 
did not need to be textually specified in the Article II Vesting Clause because it is 
inherent in the very concept of “executive Power” as the Constitution uses that term.  
(We will later demonstrate that the “necessary and proper” requirement is also implicit in 
the grant of the executive power.)  It is the nature of the President’s “executive Power” to 
implement existing law, not to create new law.  The “executive Power,” despite its 
textually unqualified nature, is an implementational power. 
                                                 
160   This proposition, and its implications for the nondelegation doctrine, is explored in Gary Lawson, 
Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 Va. L. Rev. 327, 337-40 (2002). 
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That also explains how the federal treaty power can be implementational even 
though the Treaty Clause does not contain the kind of language found in the Sweeping 
Clause.  The grant to the President of the “executive Power,” at least in its fundamental 
function of executing the laws, carries with it, by its very nature, a requirement that it be 
used only for carrying into execution federal law.  No textual limitation to that effect was 
necessary.  Executive power and legislative power are different enough in character to 
require different forms of limitation; one would not expect grants of legislative power to 
be textually limited in precisely the same manner as grants of executive power.  To the 
extent that the treaty power is part of the “executive Power” granted by the Vesting 
Clause, one similarly would not expect the same kinds of textual limitations that one 
finds on legislative power. 
 At least, that is true of the “executive Power” in its “essential meaning” of 
executing the laws of the United States.  There is more to the executive power than that.  
How much more is a matter of considerable controversy, which we cannot hope to 
address here.  It suffices to say that the Constitution’s vesting of “all legislative Powers 
herein granted” in Congress, and its creation of a judiciary department separate from the 
executive, counsels in favor of a relatively narrow understanding of the scope of the 
executive power.161  It is hard to dispute, however, that the Article II Vesting Clause 
confers, in addition to the power to execute the laws of the United States, a certain degree 
of federative, or foreign affairs, powers not otherwise allocated to any federal institution 
                                                 
161   For an excellent overview of the historical debate and a defense of a minimalist conception of the 
executive power, see Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1 
(1993). 
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that involve a significant degree of policymaking.162  These powers do not simply carry 
into effect the ends set by other governmental actors; they constitute an independent head 
of jurisdiction vested in the President.  But they only grant jurisdiction of a limited kind.  
Most importantly, these general foreign affairs powers typically are not lawmaking 
powers; they do not permit the President unilaterally to impose rights and obligations on 
citizens.163  Rather, these powers concern such matters as communication with foreign 
nations and the recall of ambassadors. 
Some presidential foreign affairs powers, however, do have the potential to affect 
private rights.  If Professors Prakash and Ramsey are right that the President has the 
“executive Power” to terminate treaties (and we are officially agnostic on that point), 
private rights relating to the terminated treaties can be at stake.  And to the extent that the 
President has the power to employ military force, that action has quite significant 
consequences for the forces under his command, if not for the country at large.  Most 
significantly for our purposes, as we have discussed at length in a previous article, the 
President may act as a lawmaker with respect to occupied foreign territory during 
wartime.164  As “legisecutive” powers go, this one is about as “legis” as one can get.  It is 
limited, however, to occupied foreign territory during wartime and provides no basis for 
exercising jurisdiction over American citizens in American territory.  But it is 
                                                 
162   See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note XX.  Of course, to say that it is hard to dispute is not to say that no 
one has ever disputed it.  James Madison disputed it with considerable fervor in his exchange with 
Alexander Hamilton concerning the President’s power to issue the Neutrality Proclamation of 1793.  
Professors Curtis Bradley and Martin Flaherty, as we have seen, vociferously say nay.  See Bradley & 
Flaherty, supra note XX.  But the proposition that an ideal eighteenth-century observer would have had an 
understanding of  “executive Power” that includes a foreign affairs component of some dimension can 
withstand scrutiny. 
 
163   See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note XX, at 263-64. 
  
164   See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Hobbesian Constitution: Governing Without Authority, 95 
Nw. U.L. Rev. 581 (2001). 
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unquestionably a significant grant of power to the President.  Thus, while the bulk of the 
powers granted to the President by the Article II Vesting Clause are limited to the 
implementation of ends set by other legal actors, some of those powers are best 
understood as independent heads of jurisdiction. 
Given the dual aspect of the Article II Vesting Clause, which contains both 
implementational and jurisdiction-granting elements, how would one determine the 
proper scope of the treaty power?   Does the Treaty Clause partake solely of the 
implementational aspect of the executive power or does it also constitute a unique kind of 
jurisdiction-extending lawmaking instrument? 
Before we finalize our answer to that question, we need to flesh out more fully 
what it would mean for the treaty power to be implementational.  In particular, we need 
to understand precisely what limitations the implementational view reads into the Treaty 
Clause by virtue of its Article II location.  And that requires a 500-year detour. 
 
2.  The Principle of Reasonableness 
 
We are contending that the Treaty Clause is analogous to the Sweeping Clause: it 
exists in order to effectuate other enumerated powers of federal institutions.  The 
Sweeping Clause specifically limits its grant of power to laws “for carrying into 
Execution” federal powers.  We have already explained why the absence of such 
language in the Article II Treaty Clause can be consistent with an implementational view 
of that clause: if the treaty power is an aspect of the more general Article II “executive 
Power,” its implementational character follows as a matter of course.  The Sweeping 
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Clause, however, contains a substantive textual limitation in addition to the requirement 
that it be used only “for carrying into Execution” constitutionally granted powers.  Laws 
enacted pursuant to the Sweeping Clause must be “necessary and proper” for their 
implementational purpose.  One of us has spent a fair portion of his professional life 
plumbing the meaning of the word “proper” and has concluded that it requires executory 
legislation to conform to constitutional principles of federalism, separation of powers, 
and individual rights.165  Of course, the better-known term, because of its prominence in 
McCulloch v Maryland, is “necessary,” which denotes a causal, or telic,166 relationship 
between the means employed and the ends served.  The Sweeping Clause requires a 
certain degree of “fit” between means and ends.167  Can one similarly derive some kind of 
“necessary and proper” requirement for the treaty power from inference? 
 In order to answer this question, one needs to examine at length some eighteenth-
century background principles about delegated power.  All of the powers in the 
Constitution are delegations from the ultimate source of law.  Many of these grants of 
power unavoidably involve the exercise of discretion by public officials.  It was well 
understood in eighteenth-century English law that grants from Parliament of discretionary 
governmental authority carried the implied provision that exercises of discretion had to 
                                                 
165   See Lawson & Granger, supra note XX; Lawson, supra note XX. 
 
166   See David E. Engdahl, Constitutional Federalism in a Nutshell 20 (2d ed., West, 1987). 
 
167     The debate in McCulloch concerned how tightly the means and ends must be linked, with opponents 
of the bank arguing for a standard of strict necessity and its defenders opting for a standard of helpfulness.  
For the argument of the Bank’s opponents, see 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.), 367 (argument of Mr. Jones).  For the 
argument of the Bank’s proponents, see id., 324-25 (argument of Mr. Webster); id., 356-57 (argument of 
Attorney General); id., 386-88 (argument of Mr. Pinckney).  We need not resolve that debate here.  For 
discussions of the original meaning of the word “necessary” in the Sweeping Clause, see Randy E. Barnett, 
The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. Penn. J. Const. L. 183 (2003); Lawson, 
supra note XX, at 1709-16; Gary Lawson, Making a Federal Case Out of It: Sabri v. United States and the 
Constitution of Leviathan, 2003-04 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 119, 142-53. 
 
 75
be reasonable.168  The principle is often traced back to Rooke’s Case in 1598.169  A statute 
from the reign of Henry VIII in 1531 gave to sewer commissioners the power to 
determine needed repairs to water-control measures “as case shall require, after your 
wisdoms and discretions” and the power to assess landowners for the costs of 
maintenance and repairs as the commissioners “shall deem most convenient to be 
ordained.” 170  The Commissioners of Sewers under this statute171 had assessed on one 
landowner the full costs of a repair to a bank of the Thames, even though “divers other 
persons had lands to the quantity of 800 acres within the same level, and subject to 
drowning, if the said bank is not repaired . . . .”172  The court, through Sir Edward Coke, 
upheld the landowner’s challenge to the assessment.  An adequate ground for the decision 
was probably language in the 1427 predecessor to the statute making clear that “no 
tenants of land or tenements . . . shall in any way be spared in this,”173 but Lord Coke 
nonetheless added in dictum: 
Notwithstanding the words of the commission give authority to the 
commissioners to do according to their discretions, yet their proceedings ought to 
be limited and bound with the rule of reason and law.  For discretion is a science 
or understanding to discern between falsity and truth, between wrong and right, 
between shadows and substance, between equity and colourable glosses and 
                                                 
168   Grants of authority can, of course, be ministerial rather than discretionary.  In that circumstance, there 
is no need for a principle of reasonableness, for the agent has no discretion that can be unreasonably 
exercised. 
 
169   5 Co Rep 99b (1598). 
 
170   23 H 8 c V, § 3, cl 2-3, 4 Stat at Large 223, 224 (1531). 
 
171   Technically, the statute of 1531 expired by its own terms after 20 years, but it was continued 
indefinitely in 1549.  See 3 & 4 Ed 6 c 8, 5 Stat at Large 341 (1549). 
 
172   5 Co Rep 99b-100a. 
 
173   6 H 6 c V 3 Stat at Large 108, 110 (1427).  The vitality of this statute was specifically confirmed in the 
1531 enactment.  See 23 H 8, c V, § 6, 4 Stat at Large 227. 
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pretences, and not to do according to their wills and private affections; for as one 
saith, talis discretion discretionem confundit.174 
 
 This dictum was very influential in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  A 
similar sentiment was often repeated in seventeenth-century cases,175 and in 1773 it was 
restated by the court in Leader v Moxon.176  A statute gave paving commissioners power 
to pave and repair streets “ ‘in such a manner as the commissioners shall think fit.’ ”  The 
court (one of whose judges was William Blackstone) nonetheless awarded damages when 
the commissioners ordered part of a street raised so high that it obstructed the plaintiff’s 
doors and windows, because “the commissioners had grossly exceeded their powers, 
which must have a reasonable construction.  Their discretion is not arbitrary, but must be 
limited by reason and law.”177    As the court explained, “the act could never intend that 
any of the householders should pay a rate of 1s. 6d. in the pound in order to have their 
houses buried under ground, and their windows and doors obstructed . . . .  [H]ad 
Parliament intended to demolish or render useless some houses for the benefit or 
ornament of the rest, it would have given express powers for that purpose, and given an 
equivalent for the loss that individuals might have sustained thereby.”178 
                                                 
174   5 Co Rep 99b-100a. 
 
175   See Stanley de Smith, Harry Woolf & Jeffrey Jowell, Judicial Review of Administrative Action 
297-98 (5th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 1995); H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law 353 (8th 
ed., Oxford University Press, 2000). 
 
176   2 W Bl 924 (1828) (reporting cases from Westminster Hall from 1746-1779). 
 
177   Id., 924-25. 
 
178   Id., 925. 
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In England, the statement from Rooke’s Case “has lost nothing of its accuracy in 
over 400 years”179; the principle of reasonableness remains one of the bedrocks of 
English administrative law. 
The principle of reasonableness in the exercise of delegated discretionary power 
is a common law principle that the eighteenth-century colonists would have found very 
congenial given its rights-protective and anti-monarchical character.  But what could this 
principle mean operationally in the context of the powers delegated under the American 
Constitution? 
In England before the founding, delegated power effectively meant executive 
power (which included what we now think of as judicial power).  The quintessential case 
of discretion pertained to the choice of means for carrying out ends established by 
Parliament.  In that context, discretion can be limited from at least three important 
directions.  First, one can say that the delegatee’s choice of means must be measured, in 
the sense of reasonably proportionate to the end sought.  One does not burn down a 
village to kill a fox--or, perhaps more to the point, one does not ordinarily fix a road by 
destroying a house when less destructive alternatives are available.  Continental lawyers 
have raised this notion of proportionality to the level of high principle, refining it and 
using it to require a relatively precise fit between means and ends that approximates the 
“least restrictive alternative” analysis familiar to First Amendment lawyers.180  English 
law has never recognized this “principle of proportionality” as a distinct legal 
                                                 
179   Wade & Forsyth, supra note XX, at 353. 
 
180   See de Smith, Woolf & Jowell, supra note XX, at 596.  For general discussions of the continental 
principle of proportionality, see Jurgen Schwarze, European Administrative Law 677-88 (1992); 
Robert Thomas, Legitimate Expectations and Proportionality in Administrative Law 77-85 (2000). 
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requirement.181  It certainly was not a part of English law in the eighteenth century, if 
only because the principle was developed in Germany in the nineteenth century.182  
Nonetheless, it is not difficult to see elements of proportionality (though not the fully 
refined continental principle) in the traditional common law concept of reasonableness; 
“the principles of reasonableness and proportionality cover a great deal of common 
ground.”183  It is very natural to describe a decision as “unreasonable” if the means are 
grossly disproportionate to the ends, and many English decisions, including Leader v 
Moxon, are consistent with this observation.184 
A second dimension of unreasonableness is efficacy: a discretionary 
implementational decision could be thought of as unreasonable if the chosen means are 
ill-suited to achieve the desired ends.  Considerations of cause and effect are a basic facet 
of rational thinking.  And a third element of unreasonableness might be substantive: a 
discretionary decision could be seen as unreasonable, however measured and efficacious 
it might be, if it trenches on substantive rights or represents an inappropriate 
consideration of manifestly relevant factors. 
The most important question, of course, is how far a decision must stray from 
perfection in order to be “unreasonable.”  There is a large difference, for example, 
between requiring an implementational decision to be the least restrictive alternative and 
requiring it to be plausibly related to the desired end.  For now, however, let us leave that 
                                                 
181   Its adoption has, however, often been urged in modern times, see Thomas, supra note XX, at 86-110, 
and the principle “may well infiltrate British law” through decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights, which engages in proportionality review.  Wade & Forsyth, supra note XX, at 368. 
 
182   See de Smith, Woolf & Jowell, supra note XX, at 593. 
 
183   Wade & Forsyth, supra note XX, at 368. 
 
184   See de Smith, Woolf & Jowell, supra note XX, at 603-05. 
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critical question aside.  It is enough for present purposes to recognize that the abstract 
principle of reasonableness was a foundational principle of delegated implementational 
power in eighteenth century English common law. 
One of the great innovations of American constitutionalism is the idea that all 
governmental power stems from a delegation.  All powers of federal actors are delegated 
powers.  Accordingly, when the Constitution delegated discretionary implementational 
powers to federal actors in 1788, it is eminently sensible to suppose that those delegations 
carried with them the common law principle of reasonableness.  Consider, for instance, 
the President’s “executive Power” to execute the laws.  Could the President, exercising 
discretion in the selection of forms and means of law enforcement, apprehend a suspect 
holed up in Concord by leveling the entire town?  Could the President, exercising 
discretion in the forms and means of legal interpretation, interpret laws by channeling the 
spirit of Elvis?  Could the President in 1790, prior to ratification of the Fourth 
Amendment, exercise discretionary investigative powers by indiscriminately searching an 
entire region?  We think that all of these measures would be, not merely ill-advised, but 
unconstitutional.185  The Article II Vesting Clause grants the President discretion in law 
execution, but that discretion is bounded.  Not everything done by the President, even in 
the guise of executing the laws, is an exercise of the “executive Power” delegated 
through the Constitution. 
 The same is true of the “judicial Power” granted by the Article III Vesting Clause.  
Suppose that a federal judge exercises the “judicial Power” to decide a case by flipping a 
                                                 
185   The difference between “ill-advised” and “unconstitutional” is relevant if the President’s actions give 
rise to a private-law cause of action that is not barred by immunity.  If the act is unconstitutional, then the 
actors could not claim actual legal authorization for their conduct. 
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coin.  The judge’s decision could certainly be reversed on appeal.  The judge could 
certainly be impeached and removed by Congress.  But has the judge violated the 
Constitution?  We say yes.186  The case-deciding power granted by the Constitution’s 
Article III Vesting Clause is not entirely unbounded.  There is substantial room within 
that grant of power for different methodologies, and even substantial room for error, but 
at some point a judgment falls so far off the map that it simply ceases to be an exercise of 
the judicial power.  Not everything done by a judge, even in the guise of deciding a case, 
is an exercise of the “judicial Power” within the meaning of Article III.  The limits may 
be broad, but there are limits. 
 The delegated powers to execute the laws and to decide cases are both 
implementational, rather than ends-setting, powers.  Accordingly, they necessarily carry 
with them the principle of reasonableness in the exercise of discretionary delegated 
powers.  That principle did not need to be expressly stated in the Constitution because it 
is part of the very nature of delegations of implementational powers such as the 
“executive Power” and the “judicial Power” as understood in eighteenth-century common 
law. 
 The common law principle of reasonableness was never applied to Parliament (or, 
more precisely, to the King or Queen in Parliament).  It was a principle that applied only 
to discretionary authority delegated from Parliament, not to supreme legislative authority.  
Indeed, the law imposed no limits, of reasonableness or otherwise, on the legislative 
                                                 
186   Again, the answer could be legally relevant if there is not an absolute judicial immunity from civil 
lawsuits.  The Supreme Court has said that there is absolute immunity even for actions taken in bad faith 
without jurisdiction.  See Bradley v Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871).  We plan to explore the 
correctness of this determination, as well as larger questions of executive and sovereign immunity, in a 
subsequent work. 
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supremacy of Parliament,187 which stood above the other two governmental departments 
in the legal hierarchy. 
The Congress under the American Constitution, of course, is not Parliament.  
Congress is not hierarchically superior to the executive or judicial departments.  
Congress, as does the President and the federal courts, exercises only delegated power, 
and that power is far from limitless.  If the principle of reasonableness derives solely 
from the existence of delegated discretionary power, then it would follow that the 
delegated authority of Congress is subject to constraints of proportionality, efficacy, and 
substantive reasonableness.  But would a cautious eighteenth-century lawyer be satisfied 
with that inference?  Could someone plausibly argue that the principle of reasonableness 
does not apply to Parliament simply because Parliament (at least in its legislative guise) 
exercises legislative rather than implementational executive or judicial power?  If that is 
the correct basis for refusing to extend the principle of reasonableness to Parliament, it 
would apply as well to Congress, in which case grants of enumerated power to Congress 
would not necessarily carry with them a requirement of reasonableness in the exercise of 
discretion.  Accordingly, it makes sense to specify a constitutional constraint on 
Congress’s discretionary powers if such a constraint is desired. 
The language of the Sweeping Clause elegantly subjects Congress’s 
implementational legislative powers to the principle of reasonableness.  The phrase 
“necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” is an excellent way to describe 
requirements of proportionality, efficacy, and substantive reasonableness.  A measure is 
“necessary” if it is proportionate, and it is “proper” if it is well suited to its task 
                                                 
187   See A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 3-11 (8th ed., 1982). 
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(efficacious) and substantively reasonable.  It is no accident that when the modern 
European Court of Justice described the principle of proportionality, it said that the 
principle, inter alia, requires measures to be “appropriate and necessary in order to 
achieve the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question.”188 
In sum, there are very good reasons why the federal Constitution would textually 
specify in the Sweeping Clause that executory laws must be “necessary and proper” but 
would not use equivalent language in Article II or Article III.  Discretionary executive 
and judicial powers, by their nature, carry with them the principle of reasonableness.  
Perhaps that is true as well of delegated legislative power (or perhaps at least of delegated 
implementational legislative power), so that a requirement of reasonableness would exist 
even in the absence of the “necessary and proper” language in the Sweeping Clause, but 
the matter is open enough to question to make it prudent to specify the desired limitation 
on Congress.  
  The treaty power, we contend, is an implementational, executive power delegated 
in Article II.  Accordingly, it carries the principle of reasonableness by its nature, without 
need for textual specification.  The absence of “necessary and proper” language in the 
Treaty Clause does not point away from a requirement of a means-ends “fit” for treaties--
no more than it does for other delegated Article II and Article III powers.  Just as 
exercises of the law-execution and case-deciding powers must be proportionate, 
efficacious, and substantively reasonable, the same is true of exercises of the treaty-
making power.  It remains to be determined, of course, whether the degree of 
proportionality, efficaciousness, and reasonableness required of treaties is greater, 
                                                 
188   Thomas, supra note XX, at 79 (quoting R. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte 
Fedesa, ECR (1990)). 
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smaller, or the same as the degree required of executory legislation under the Sweeping 
Clause, exercises of law-enforcement discretion, or exercises of judicial power, but the 
basic principle of reasonableness applies to treaties. 
 
  3.  Jeffersonian Treaties 
 
 The implementational view of treaties thus reads the Treaty Clause as an 
executive power that is, by its nature, subject to a requirement that exercises of the treaty 
power be “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” other federal powers.  The 
baseline constitutional presumption is that executive powers are implementational; the 
elements of the constitutionally-granted “executive Power” that are not purely 
implementational are quite limited, both in number and in sphere of application.  There is 
especially good reason to apply this presumption in the case of the treaty power, because 
tearing it loose from its implementational moorings, and the implicit “necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution” requirement that goes with that designation, would 
leave it without obvious limits.  This would be, to say the least, anomalous for an 
executive power.  The Treaty Clause thus seems much more like the usual run of purely 
implementational executive powers than like the few odd executive powers that make the 
President a lawmaker.  An implementational treaty power makes sense in the context of 
Article II.  It also makes sense in the context of the Constitution as a whole, to which we 
next turn. 
 
VI.  TAKING CONSEQUENCES SERIOUSLY: THE STRUCTURAL ROLE OF THE TREATY 
CLAUSE 
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 Constitutional clauses do not exist in a vacuum.  The actual clauses of the actual 
Constitution were presented to the public in 1787 as an integrated package.  We know, 
for instance, that the Article II Vesting Clause grants the President the executive power of 
the United States rather than, say, the executive power of Connecticut because we can 
read the Article II Vesting Clause (which, unlike the Article III Vesting Clause, contains 
no specific mention of the United States) in pari materia with the provisions that surround 
it.  A conversation about constitutional meaning, whether in 1787 or today, would only 
be sensible if it considered how interpretations of various clauses would interact with 
other clauses. 
 
 A.  The Treaty Clause in Constitutional Context 
 
 Consider a treaty in which the President and the Senate agree to make non-
citizens eligible for the presidency, in apparent violation of the clause providing that 
“[n]o Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time 
of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President . . . .”189  
Is that treaty provision domestically enforceable as the supreme law of the land?  If the 
Treaty Clause is read as a jurisdictional grant, there is nothing in the Treaty Clause to 
suggest any limitation on the content of treaties.  Nonetheless, the treaty provision is 
clearly inoperative on any plausible understanding of the Treaty Clause.  As a matter of 
domestic law, the Constitution is hierarchically superior to all other forms of law, 
                                                 
189   U.S. Const. art II, § 1, cl 5. 
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including statutes and treaties.  The same reasoning by inference that led John Marshall 
correctly to place the Constitution above federal statutes also leads to the conclusion that 
the Constitution is supreme over treaties.  The Eligibility Clause, unlike some provisions 
such as the First Amendment or the Slave Trade Clause, is framed in sufficiently general 
terms to apply to all federal actions, regardless of their form.  It accordingly forbids the 
treaty provision in question. 
Once it is acknowledged that treaties cannot violate the Constitution, the trick 
becomes to determine what counts as a constitutional violation.  Surely treaties cannot do 
what the Constitution expressly forbids to all actors, including the President and Senate, 
such as granting titles of nobility or withdrawing money from the Treasury without an 
appropriation.  Thus, provisions of the Constitution framed as “thou shalt nots” apply to 
the treaty power whenever their terms encompass the treaty-making authority and not 
simply a more specific constitutional actor such as Congress. 
Another kind of constitutional violation would be an attempt to accomplish 
actions through forms other than those prescribed by the Constitution.  A treaty could not, 
for instance, permit a revenue measure to originate in the Senate, dispense with the 
presentment requirement, or permit the delegation of legislative power.  And if France 
took objection to the location of Vermont’s capital in the French-sounding city of 
Montpelier, and accordingly demanded as a condition of a commercial treaty that 
Vermont be deprived of its voice in the Senate, the federal treaty-makers could not agree 
to that condition. 
These propositions about the inability of treaties to alter constitutional form and 
structure, of course, are not compelled by any specific textual provision.  Nor does the 
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Constitution have specific textual provisions stating that the House, Senate, and President 
under Article I, section 7, the President under the non-treaty powers in Article II, or the 
federal judiciary in Article III cannot alter basic structural arrangements.  No such 
express provision is necessary because, as Chief Justice Marshall recognized in Marbury, 
it is structurally clear that the Constitution is supreme law.  Moreover, the Constitution 
prescribes a specific amendment process, which by inference creates a very strong 
presumption against alteration of the Constitution through other means.  As a general 
interpretative principle, power grants to federal actors do not include the power to alter 
the Constitution unless that power is clearly given.190 
Hence, the seemingly unqualified power to “make Treaties,” whatever its scope or 
nature, is really a power to “make Treaties that are consistent with provisions of the 
Constitution allocating federal governmental power and that do not violate prohibitory 
provisions of the Constitution framed broadly enough to apply to the treaty-making 
authority.” 
But what about prohibitory provisions that are not framed broadly enough to 
apply to the treaty-making authority?  Suppose that in order to secure certain trade 
concessions with France, a treaty includes a provision demanded by the French that 
perpetually forbids all Americans from publishing any criticisms of France or the French 
government.  The First Amendment, recall, does not apply to treaties because they are not 
acts of Congress.  Of course, to the extent that the treaty requires congressional 
implementation, the First Amendment would pose a problem, but that could be avoided 
                                                 
190   The Article V amending authorities, of course, are expressly granted the power to alter the 
Constitution’s structural arrangements.  And accordingly, their authority is expressly limited by the proviso 
that no state may be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate without its consent. 
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by making the treaty provision self-executing, perhaps by giving the French government 
power to enforce the prohibition through civil actions for libel.  Does the Constitution 
permit the American treaty-makers to refashion state libel law in this manner?  And what 
if the French--in accordance with fears actually voiced at the North Carolina ratifying 
convention--further added a provision mandating that Catholicism be declared the official 
religion of the United States?191  Is that concession within the power of the President and 
Senate?  If the answer is “no,” it is not by virtue of anything contained in the First 
Amendment or any other express provision of the Constitution; it must be by virtue of 
something internal to the treaty power.  Finally, suppose that the French, once again upset 
by the location of Vermont’s capital in the French-sounding city of Montepelier, demand 
as a condition of a trade agreement that the capital be moved to an Anglo-sounding city 
such as Burlington.  Congress clearly has no enumerated power to alter state capitals, but 
does anything prevent the treaty-making authorities from agreeing to the deal, which then 
becomes “the supreme Law of the Land”? 
Most significantly, consider the effect of the Slave Trade Clause, which as we 
noted earlier does not, by its terms, apply to the treaty power.  This clause protected 
regulation of the slave trade for the Nation’s first twenty years against ordinary 
legislation, even by unanimous majorities in both Houses.  Article V, without any special 
provision for the Slave Trade Clause, would have entrenched that firewall against 
combined majorities (and even some supermajorities) in the House, Senate, and the state 
                                                 
191   At that convention, Henry Abbott observed that “[i]t is feared by some people, that, by the power of 
making treaties, they might make a treaty engaging with foreign powers to adopt the Roman Catholic 
religion in the United States . . . .”  Jonathan Elliot, 1 Debates on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution, 191-92 (1859) (statement of Henry Abbott).  James Iredell’s tepid response was simply that 
“[t]he power to make treaties can never be supposed to include a right to establish a foreign religion among 
ourselves, though it might authorize a toleration of others.”  Id., 194 (statement of James Iredell). 
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legislatures: it would have taken a two-thirds majority in each House or a two-thirds 
majority of the state legislatures to propose an amendment repealing the Slave Trade 
Clause, and it would then have taken a three-fourths majority of the states to ratify the 
amendment.  Article V, with its special proviso that exempted the Slave Trade Clause 
from the amendment process, protected the slave trade against even that unlikely 
supermajoritarian combination.  Thus, until 1808, no possible combination – not even a 
unanimous combination -- of the President, the Congress, and the state legislatures could 
have prohibited the slave trade.  But if the treaty power is an independent grant of 
jurisdiction that is not limited to implementing other enumerated powers, then the 
President plus two-thirds of a quorum of the Senate nonetheless could have abolished the 
slave trade by treaty if only the thought had occurred to them.  Such a treaty would not 
have violated any specific prohibition in the Constitution or altered any structural form of 
action specified in the Constitution.  It simply would have done what no other possible 
combination of constitutional actors, including the amending authorities, had the 
enumerated power to do.  A Constitution that permitted pre-1808 abolition of the slave 
trade would, of course, have been a good Constitution.  The question for interpreters, 
however, is whether it is a plausible Constitution.192 
 If the Treaty Clause does give the President and the Senate power to alter state 
capitals, disestablish state religions, or end the slave trade before 1808, then the entire 
federal structure, apart from a few fortuitously worded prohibitions on federal action in 
Article I, section 9, is a President and two-thirds of a quorum of senators (and perhaps a 
bona fide demand from a foreign government) away from destruction.  That is, of course, 
                                                 
192   See William E. Mikell, The Extent of the Treaty Making Power of the President and Senate of the 
United States, 7 U. Pa. L. Rev. 435, 443 (1909). 
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not an impossible circumstance.  Some Anti-federalists desperately feared it, even if they 
did not articulate their concerns in precisely the manner that we have done.193  But in 
light of the overarching structure and themes of the Constitution, that is a conclusion that 
one ought to reach only with some hesitation.  The potential existence of a “back door” 
that would permit federal treaty makers to declare a national religion, dictate the location 
of state capitals, and abolish the slave trade in 1789 is intriguing enough to warrant a bit 
more interpretative energy with respect to the treaty power. 
One could, of course, suggest that the Treaty Clause’s requirement of two-thirds 
consent by the Senate, the body initially selected by the states themselves and in which 
each state has equal representation, is the only safeguard provided against misuse of the 
treaty power.194  Structurally, however, the provision for supermajority Senate approval 
does not support any strong inferences about the scope of the treaty power.  As John 
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport have pointed out in a powerful article, most of the 
Constitution is supermajoritarian.195  Ordinary legislation must pass through two different 
                                                 
193   Patrick Henry was particularly vocal on this score.  See 3 Elliot’s Debates, supra note XX, at 315 
(statement of Patrick Henry) (“The important right of making treaties is upon the most dangerous 
foundation.  The President, and a few senators, possess it in the most unlimited manner”).  Other prominent 
Antifederalists shared his concerns.  See id., 509 (statement of George Mason) (“The President and Senate 
can make any treaty whatsoever”); Letter IV from the Federal Farmer, Oct. 12, 1787, reprinted in 14 The 
Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 43-44 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. 
Saladino eds., 1986) (“[i]t is not said that these treaties shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, nor 
are there any constitutional bounds set to those who shall make them . . . .  This power in the president and 
senate is absolute”); Brutus II, Nov 1, 1787, reprinted in 13 The Documentary History of the Ratification 
of the Constitution 529 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986) (“I do not find any 
limitation, or restriction, to the exercise of this [treaty] power”).  James Madison’s response to these 
concerns at the Virginia ratifying convention was vague and general: “I conceive that, as far as the bills of 
rights in the states do not express any thing foreign to the nature of such things, and express fundamental 
principles essential to liberty, and those privileges which are declared necessary to all free people, these 
rights are not encroached on by this government.”  3 Elliot’s Debates, supra note XX, at 516 (statement of 
James Madison). 
 
194   See Flaherty, supra note XX, at 1308-09. 
 
195   See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 
703 (2002). 
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branches of the legislature that are (at least under the original constitutional design) 
selected by different majorities.196  It must then be presented to the President, who 
represents yet a different majority.  Passage through all three legislative units thus 
requires approval by three separate majorities, which is a pretty fair description of a 
supermajority requirement.  And if the President vetoes a bill, it can become law only 
with a two-thirds majority of both the House and the Senate.  Article V requires either 
two-thirds majorities in both Houses of Congress or a convention called by two-thirds of 
the state legislatures for the proposal of constitutional amendments and ratification by 
three-quarters of the states for the adoption of such amendments.  In light of the 
Constitution’s pervasive supermajoritarian theme, a requirement of approval by the 
President and by two-thirds of the Senate for treaties is not a small matter by any means, 
but it is not so extraordinary that it short-circuits an inquiry into substantive limits on the 
treaty power. 
In the end, the power to make implementational law by carrying other enumerated 
powers into effect in the international arena makes sense across all fronts.  It fulfills the 
purpose of treaties to permit the United States to enter into and acquire binding 
commitments from foreign nations.  It acknowledges the lawmaking character of the 
treaty power while still grounding it in the larger structure of Article II.  And, most 
importantly, it prevents the Treaty Clause from unraveling the rest of the constitutional 
scheme.  If the Treaty Clause is read as jurisdiction-extending, one must either figure out 
some way to limit it, the difficulty of which is demonstrated by two centuries of debates, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
196   Even in a post-Seventeenth Amendment world, there can be a real difference between the majorities 
required to elect a senator and a representative in any state that conducts House elections by district and 
that has more than one district. 
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or maintain that the middle of Article II contains a constitutional joker.  To put it bluntly, 
an authorization to implement other grants of jurisdiction makes sense in the overall 
context of the Constitution, while a grant of jurisdiction to pursue independent ends does 
not. 
 There is no a priori requirement that the Constitution make sense, but if one is 
trying to project how a fully informed eighteenth-century audience, knowing all that there 
is to know about the Constitution and the surrounding world, would have understood the 
power to “make Treaties,” the implementational view looks pretty good. To read the 
Treaty Clause as an end-setting provision, with no direct connection to the otherwise 
careful enumerations of federal powers, simply does too much damage to the rest of the 
Constitution to be a plausible reading of a brief clause in Article II, section 2.  Once 
again, Jefferson was right. 
We must still determine in precisely what fashion Jefferson was right.  There is an 
ambiguity in the notion of an “implementational” treaty power.  On the strictest 
understanding, treaties can only be used to carry into effect powers already exercised by 
other governmental actors.  Thus, if Congress tries to regulate foreign commerce in a way 
that requires the agreement of a foreign sovereign, a treaty could validly implement that 
prior exercise of the lawmaking power.  But on this understanding, a treaty could not 
regulate foreign commerce without first having an exercise of congressional power to 
implement.  This would directly assimilate the treaty power into the the executive power, 
which carries into effect laws that already exist. 
That is not, however, the only sense in which a power can be “implementational.”  
Consider the Sweeping Clause.  The Clause is an implementational power in that it only 
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grants Congress power to pass laws “for carrying into Execution” other granted powers.  
But Congress does not need to wait for those other powers actually to be exercised in 
order to use its authority under the Sweeping Clause.  For instance, Congress could 
appropriate funds and authorize the appointment of officers for the negotiation of a 
particular treaty, even if the President ultimately chooses not to negotiate the treaty at all.  
Indeed, because all appropriations come from acts of Congress pursuant to the Sweeping 
Clause, such legislation often must be enacted before the power that Congress seeks to 
implement is exercised.  On this understanding of an “implementational” power, the 
power can “pave the way” for the exercise of powers elsewhere granted to institutions of 
the national government without awaiting the actual exercise of those powers. 
There is yet a third possibility to consider.  In his September 7, 1803 letter to 
Wilson Cary Nicholas expressing his view of the treaty power, Jefferson said that the 
Constitution “specifies & delineates the operations permitted to the federal government, 
and gives all the powers necessary to carry these into execution.  Whatever of these 
enumerated objects is proper for a law, Congress may make the law; whatever is proper 
to be executed by way of a treaty, the President & Senate may enter into the treaty . . . .”  
If one emphasizes the phrase “enumerated objects,” one can come up with a “hybrid” 
conception of the treaty power that permits it, on some occasions, to function as a stand-
alone power.  The Constitution’s power-granting provisions can be viewed as the 
specification of ends or goals that the national government may permissibly pursue.  
Thus, the Commerce Clause specifies the permissible end or goal of regulating foreign 
commerce.  A treaty, on this hybrid understanding, can be used to pursue this otherwise-
specified end, but it need not be tied in any way to an exercise of congressional power.  
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That is, the President and the Senate would have an independent jurisdiction to enter into 
treaties regulating foreign commerce, even if Congress has not acted,197 but they could 
only exercise this independent power in connection with ends specified in some provision 
of the Constitution other than the Treaty Clause. 
This was not, of course, Jefferson’s own position.  Jefferson, we should recall, 
believed that treaties cannot concern matters that could “otherwise be regulated” or 
matters in which the Constitution “gave a participation to the House of Representatives.”  
In other words, where the Constitution specified a particular form for action, Jefferson 
regarded that form as exclusive.  The person to whom Jefferson wrote on September 7, 
1803, however, articulated a position fairly close to this hybrid view.  In a letter to 
Jefferson of September 3, 1803, Wilson Cary Nicholas, then a Virginia senator, tried to 
dissuade Jefferson from expressing doubts about the constitutionality of the Louisiana 
Purchase or from articulating an unduly narrow conception of the treaty power.  He 
explained that he did not “see anything in the constitution that limits the treaty power, 
except the general limitation of the power given to the government, and the evident 
object for which the government was instituted.”198  By “the general limitation of the 
power given to the government,” one can easily mean “the ends and objects that 
institutions of the federal government may permissibly pursue under their enumerated 
powers.”  This understanding is consistent with the views expressed by George Nicholas 
at the Virginia ratifying convention, in which he said that no treaty could be made “which 
                                                 
197   What happens under this theory if Congress has already acted depends on the hierarchical status of 
treaties and laws.  See Kesavan, supra note XX. 
 
198   Letter from Wilson Cary Nicholas to Thomas Jefferson, Sept. 3, 1803, quoted in Everett S. Brown, 
The Constitutional History of the Louisiana Purchase 27 (1920). 
 
 94
shall be repugnant to the spirit of the Constitution, or inconsistent with the delegated 
powers.”199 
This hybrid position has the typical virtues and vices of a compromise.  Its 
primary virtue is that it gives wide effect to the arguably “legis” aspect of the treaty 
power while providing clearly marked boundaries for the exercise of the power.  Its 
primary, and fatal, vice is that it misunderstands the Constitution.  The Constitution does 
not specify permissible ends for the national government to pursue.  Rather, it grants 
specific powers to specific institutions of the national government.  In that sense, it 
specifies permissible ends, as well as permissible means, but they are not ends and means 
for “the national government” as a unitary entity.  The hybrid view amounts to saying 
that every power granted to any institution of the national government is also 
independently granted to the President and the Senate: Congress (and the President) can 
regulate foreign commerce by statute, so the President and Senate can regulate foreign 
commerce by treaty.  But changing the example shows the deep flaw in this approach: 
Congress and the state legislatures can amend the Constitution, so can the President and 
Senate amend the Constitution by treaty?  No, no, one immediately objects.  When 
Article V confers the amendment power, it confers it on specific institutions to be 
exercised in a specific form.  It does not simply specify an abstract end of amending the 
Constitution; it also designates the proper institution and form for pursuing that end.  
That is true, but it is as true of the foreign commerce power as it is of Article V 
This means that compromise is not possible.  Either the Treaty Clause is an 
independent grant of subject-matter jurisdiction to the President and Senate or it is a 
                                                 
199   3 Elliot’s Debates, supra note XX, at 507 (statement of George Nicholas). 
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power to carry into effect (whether prospectively or after-the-fact) valid exercises of 
power by other federal governmental actors.  For the reasons that we have already given, 
the latter view makes the most sense in light of the Constitution’s architecture.  The 
remaining question is whether the treaty power is “triggered” only by prior exercises of 
constitutional authority or may also be used, a la the Sweeping Clause, to facilitate 
anticipated exercises of authority.  For our purposes, nothing of consequence turns on this 
question, though the latter view makes more sense in view of the general character of 
implementational authority.  All things considered, the best way to integrate the treaty 
power into the constitutional structure is to treat it as an implementing mechanism for all 
federal powers. 
It  is, of course, always dangerous to reason from conclusions to interpretations.  
Unless one fully equates the meaning of a provision with its intended results, which we 
do not, one must acknowledge the possibility that the Constitution might fail to achieve at 
least some of the ends that were expected of it.  We therefore are not claiming that odd 
results can overcome a clear contextual meaning.  But as we have endeavored to show, 
the case for reading the Treaty Clause as an independent head of jurisdiction is far from 
contextually clear.  The stark language of the Treaty Clause does not, as some have 
claimed, settle that question.  Rather, it requires us to determine how a fully informed 
eighteenth-century observer would have understood the Constitution’s power to “make 
Treaties.”  Paradigm cases, particularly paradigm cases as extreme as the ones that we 
have invoked, are relevant to that inquiry.  If an interpretation of the Treaty Clause is 
available that avoids the kinds of major sinkholes into which other interpretations get 
sucked, that is a point, albeit not a conclusive one, in its favor. 
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B.  Treaties’ Domains 
 
 Once we make that move, however, we must identify the breadth and depth of the 
sinkholes to which our own interpretation is vulnerable.  What kinds of treaty provisions 
that an eighteenth-century observer would have regarded as unproblematic would the 
Jeffersonian implementational interpretation call into question? 
 Treaties of peace are no problem for the Jeffersonian view.  Although Congress 
cannot terminate a war, and the Treaty Clause therefore cannot be used to implement any 
such congressional power, the President can terminate a war.200  Peace treaties can then 
formalize and set the terms of--in other words, can implement--the state of peace created 
by the President, which is precisely what the implementational theory of the Treaty 
Clause contemplates.  Because the treaty power is implementational, the treaty could not 
end the war without concomitant presidential action, but because the treaty itself cannot 
exist without presidential action to put it before the Senate, that is a matter of no moment. 
 The more interesting question is what kinds of concessions can be made in peace 
treaties.  To say that the President and Senate can execute a peace treaty is not to say that 
they can do so any terms whatsoever.  On the implementational view, any provision in a 
peace treaty, as in any other treaty, must carry into effect some constitutional power of 
some federal actor.  Recognition of a state of peace effectuates the President’s 
peacemaking powers, but peace treaties often do much more than declare peace.  In 
particular, peace treaties, and other treaties as well, are often occasions for the exchange 
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of territory.  Vasan Kesavan has recently demonstrated, at great length, that the general 
understanding at the time of the framing was that treaties permitted the cession of 
American territory, including territory that was part of a state, without the consent of the 
state in which the territory was located.  We accept the proposition that a fully-informed 
eighteenth-century audience would have been startled to discover that the federal 
government had no power to cede territory, even as part of a peace settlement.  The 
implementational view of the Treaty Clause is consistent with this expectation--up to a 
point. 
 There is no problem at all with treaties ceding territory that belongs exclusively to 
the United States.  Congress can cede that property by ordinary legislation through its 
power under the Property Clause to “dispose of . . . Territory or other Property belonging 
to the United States,”201 and there is accordingly no issue about implementing that power 
through treaty.  The Property Clause, however, does not authorize Congress to dispose of 
territory belonging to a state.  What if the requested price for peace, or even for a 
particularly attractive commercial treaty, is Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire? 
 Our answer is that state territory can be ceded away as part of a peace settlement 
but not otherwise.  Once the treaty power is seen as wholly implementational, there is no 
arguable power in any federal actor to alienate state territory during peacetime and 
therefore nothing for the treaty power to implement.  During wartime, however, the 
President has the power to “cede” state territory by refusing to defend it (or by defending 
it and losing).  Once territory is occupied by an invading foreign sovereign, the invader, 
pursuant to international law, gets to govern the territory in accordance with its own 
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political institutions.  A treaty of peace that formally cedes the conquered territory 
thereby implements the presidential decision to sacrifice part of the country during 
wartime in order to save the rest. 
 The joker in the deck, of course, is the Guarantee Clause, which provides that 
“[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of 
Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion . . . .”202  Does this Clause 
forbid the President, either as commander-in-chief or as treaty-maker, from making a 
tactical decision to sacrifice one state to save another by imposing a duty to protect 
“each” of the states against invasion? 
 There are two ways to understand this clause.  First, it might impose on the 
President a duty to defend in good faith every part of the country with equal vigor.  This 
understanding would satisfy the concern that the President might neglect invasions in 
disfavored areas or play geographical favorites in the event of a large-scale invasion.203  
It would also permit the President to surrender state territory in a good-faith exercise of 
tactical judgment, and accordingly would permit the formal transfer of such territory in 
peace treaties.  Alternatively, the Guarantee Clause might be read as an absolute 
prohibition on the surrender of any state territory under any circumstances.  This would 
mean that if any part of the Union fell to foreign invasion, the entire Union must fight to 
the death until the invader is repelled or the Union ceases to exist as a viable political 
entity.  This understanding would, of course, forbid treaties of cession--but it would do so 
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even on a much broader understanding of the scope of the Treaty Clause.  The Guarantee 
Clause, after all, is phrased as a duty imposed on “[t]he United States” and accordingly 
extends to the treaty-making authority.  Even if the Treaty Clause was an independent 
head of jurisdiction for the national government, it would be limited by the duties 
imposed by the Guarantee Clause, including any putative duty to refuse to surrender state 
territory.  Thus, if the federal government is forbidden from surrendering state territory, it 
is not because of anything peculiar to the implementational view of the treaty power, but 
because of the supervening force of the Guarantee Clause. 
 The implementational view does, however, limit the circumstances under which 
state territory can be ceded.  State territory can be ceded as part of a peace settlement, but 
not as part of ordinary commercial relations.  Northern New England could not be traded 
away for fishing rights in the Gulf of Mexico or favorable tariff status for cotton.  We do 
not believe that a fully-informed eighteenth-century audience would have been 
scandalized by this outcome. 
 Treaties of acquisition pose some complicated problems, which we have explored 
at considerable length elsewhere.204  The short answer is that the United States may 
acquire territory by treaty whenever it is reasonable to do so in order to implement an 
enumerated power, such as the power to admit new states205 or the power to provide and 
maintain a navy.206  Most of America’s acquisitions by treaty easily satisfy this test.  The 
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acquisition of the Philippines probably did not,207 and the acquisition of Alaska was a 
close call.208 
 Treaties of commerce are among the most common types of treaties.  Such 
treaties can fix the terms of trade, set tariff levels, or grant navigational rights.  A treaty 
power that did not include the ability to enter into such agreements would be as peculiar 
as a treaty power that did not authorize treaties of peace. 
 Such treaties are permissible as vehicles for implementing the congressional 
powers to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises”209 and to “regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations.”210  The implementational character of the treaty power 
does mean, however, that treaties cannot unilaterally set tariff rates or trade rules without 
congressional action.  They can carry into effect statutes that already exist.  They can 
establish frameworks that are triggered by subsequent statutes.   But they cannot create 
free-standing regulatory regimes. 
 This understanding is contrary to established practice, but not so contrary to 
eighteenth-century expectations that it threatens to take the implementational view of 
treaties off the table.  Under conventional understandings of the treaty power, in which 
treaties can fix tariff levels or terms of trade, those treaties “bind” the United States as a 
matter of international law, but not as a matter of domestic law.  Subsequent 
congressional statutes that violate the terms of the treaty are perfectly valid as a matter of 
domestic law.  They may embroil the United States in international problems, but they 
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are not, in any meaningful sense, “unconstitutional.”  Full effectiveness of a treaty always 
requires the collaboration of Congress, if only through inaction, even if one views treaties 
as self-executing (that is, as taking effect without legislative implementation).  Our view 
is not all that different in substance.  Under an implementational theory of treaties, 
treaties of commerce always require the collaboration of Congress through affirmative 
action: Congress must either enact a statute for the treaty to implement or, if no such 
statute yet exists, the treaty can at most establish a contingent legal framework that is 
triggered by congressional action.  Put in the language of modern debates, treaties are not 
self-executing with respect to Congress, though they are self-executing with respect to 
the states by virtue of the Supremacy Clause. 
 Of course, in the process of “implementing” an exercise of power embodied in a 
specific statute, a treaty “dis-implements” subsequent exercises of the same power by 
attaching international legal consequences to the enactment of statutes that are 
inconsistent with the terms of the treaty.  But that is always a possibility with 
implementational powers.  The Property Clause, for instance, is both substantive and 
implementational: the power to dispose of and regulate federal property is a self-
contained authorization of both means and ends.  Suppose that Congress exercises the 
power to “dispose of . . . Property belonging to the United States” by vesting a land title 
in a private person.  That statute “dis-implements” future acts that seek to, for instance, 
make the property part of a post road.  Congress can, in fact, make the land part of a post 
road even after it has been vested in a private party, but there are legal consequences that 
attach to that action--namely, an obligation to provide just compensation for the taking of 
property.  More directly, if the executive “implements” a statutory scheme by entering 
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into contracts, those contracts create legal obligations that “dis-implement” future 
actions, in the sense of attaching legal consequences to future actions that are inconsistent 
with the original implementing act.  Treaties have the same status and effect.  The treaty-
making authority can bind the United States as a matter of international law in the course 
of implementing enumerated powers, in the sense of making future legislative action bear 
legal consequences.  That is a significant result, of course, which is why the treaty power 
is a significant power. 
 A more vexing problem concerns treaty provisions that address subjects typically 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the states, such as private-law rights of tort, contract, 
property, and descent.  It is commonplace to give foreign emissaries broad immunity 
from local laws and broad powers that states might not otherwise give to aliens.  It was 
also commonplace in the founding era.  On July 29, 1789, the Senate ratified a treaty with 
France that had been negotiated by the Confederation government involving reciprocal 
privileges of consuls and vice-consuls,211 which “trenched more deeply on state 
prerogatives than any of the other previous treaties negotiated under the Confederation” 
by, inter alia, granting “consular officials and employees and consular premises extensive 
immunities from the operation of state laws (though not compelled to do so by the law of 
nations) . . . .” 212  What power, if any, do treaty provisions of this kind implement? 
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 The only possible power is the President’s power under Article II to “receive 
Ambassadors and other public Ministers.”213  Blackstone understood the English King’s 
power to receive foreign emissaries to include, as a necessary incident, the power to 
receive them free of the normal constraints of municipal law: “[t]he rights, the powers, 
the duties, and the privileges of embassadors are determined by the law of nature and 
nations, and not by any municipal constitution.”214  If the President’s constitutional power 
to “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers” includes the right to receive them 
under similar conditions of immunity,215 then a treaty could implement that power.  Of 
course, in order to know whether the 1789 Consular Convention was constitutional, one 
would need to explore whether the power (and perhaps duty) to grant immunity to foreign 
emissaries extended to consuls216 and whether it included all of the provisions contained 
in that treaty.  We are less interested in the answer to that question than in the general 
principle that determines the scope of the treaty power to grant rights and immunities to 
foreign emissaries. 
 Foreign citizens, as opposed to official foreign emissaries, are a different story.  
One of the most contentious foreign relations issues in early American history was the 
extent to which treaties, either under the authority of the Articles of Confederation or of 
the Constitution, could give alien citizens rights to own and dispose of real property 
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contrary to state law, presumably in exchange for similar rights for American citizens in 
foreign countries.  The best-known example is Article 9 of the Jay Treaty of 1795, which 
declared that “British Subjects who now hold Lands in the Territories of the United States 
. . . shall continue to hold them according to the nature and Tenures of their respective 
Estates and Titles therein, and may grant Sell or Devise the same to whom they please, in 
like manner as if they were Natives.”217  Just where did federal treaty negotiators get the 
power to dictate state rules of property ownership and descent? 
 They didn’t.  An implementational view of the Treaty Clause would not permit 
provisions of this nature.  If that limitation unduly burdened federal treaty-makers, they 
would need a constitutional amendment to authorize reciprocal property-ownership 
provisions and other provisions that involve powers not otherwise allocated to some 
federal institution.  As the founding-era controversies over such provisions demonstrates, 
a significant portion of the actual eighteenth-century public would have found this 
conclusion wholly congenial.  If the hypothetical, fully informed eighteenth-century 
audience that is the target of our inquiry would have been at all distressed by that 
conclusion, we suspect that it would be far more surprised by a conclusion that the slave 
trade could have been ended in 1789 if only the President could have mustered a two-
thirds majority of a quorum of the Senate. 
 
 C.  The Epistemology of the Treaty Clause 
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 Suppose, however, that the reader is not convinced.  After all, even if we are right 
that the textual and structural case for a treaty power that extends to any subject is not, as 
Professor Golove would have it, “compelling, even overwhelming,”218 that does not 
establish that the Jeffersonian interpretation is correct either.  If both conceptions of the 
treaty power--the jurisdiction-extending view and the implementational view--can be 
advanced plausibly in terms of text and structure, where does one go from there? 
 As we have elsewhere argued at some length,219 the default rule for federal power 
is, “when in doubt, don’t.”  In other words, the burden of proof always rests with the 
proponent of federal governmental power.  If someone wants to claim that the federal 
treaty power includes the power to make treaties on matters that are not within the 
enumerated powers of any federal institution, that person must overcome a presumption 
against any such power.  That anti-power presumption is not grounded in normative or 
political concerns.  It is grounded in the basic epistemological principle that he who 
asserts the affirmative existence of something must prove it.  Because the federal 
Constitution creates the national government as a government of enumerated powers, the 
existence of a specific federal power is always a matter for proof.  Once that power is 
established, the existence of an external limitation on that power is a matter for proof, so 
the epistemological presumption does not always work against governmental power.  
Quite to the contrary, it works in favor of governmental power when one is discussing 
constitutional restraints on either the federal or state governments in the form of “thou 
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shalt nots.”  But for the threshold question of determining the scope of enumerated 
federal powers, the balance always tilts away from the power. 
 How strongly the balance tilts depends on the strength of the presumption against 
grants of federal power.  That, in turn, depends on the proper standard of proof for claims 
of constitutional meaning generally and for claims of federal power in particular.  That is 
a project for another day.  For now, it is enough simply to note that doubts about the 
scope of the treaty power should, all else being equal, be resolved against an expansive 
view of the power.  On that point as well, Jefferson was right. 
 
VII. TAKING DOUBTS SERIOUSLY: A JEFFERSONIAN CONCLUSION 
 
To be sure, the Jeffersonian view of the treaty power has significant flaws, not the 
least of which is its relative dearth of direct historical support.  But every other view of 
the treaty power has its own problems with which to contend.  In other words, we view 
Jefferson’s interpretation of the Treaty Clause through the same epistemological lens as 
did Jefferson himself.  Jefferson’s notes of Washington Administration Cabinet 
conferences from 1793 describe a discussion among some of the nation’s then-brightest 
luminaries about the form and effect of President Washington’s forthcoming Neutrality 
Proclamation.  Alexander Hamilton evidently initiated a discussion of the treaty power by 
declaring that, although the President could not unilaterally foreclose a congressional 
declaration of war by issuing a proclamation, “the constn having given power to the 
President and Senate to make treaties, they might make a treaty of neutrality which 
should take from Congress the right to declare war in that particular case, and that under 
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the form of a treaty they might exercise any powers whatever, even those exclusively 
given by the constn to the H. of representatives.”220  Edmund Randolph countered “that 
where they undertook to do acts by treaty (as to settle a tariff of duties,) which were 
exclusively given to the legislature, that an act of the legislature would be necessary to 
confirm them . . . .”221  Jefferson, for his part, insisted, as he would later do in his 
parliamentary manual, “that in givg to the Prest & Senate a power to make treaties, the 
constn meant only to authorize them to carry into effect by way of treaty any powers they 
might constitutionally exercise.”222  Jefferson noted that he “was sensible of the weak 
points in this position, but there were still weaker in the other hypothesis . . . .”223  We 
could not have put it better, and we will not try. 
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